Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

2000

A Novel Experimental Approach to the Explication of Information
Processing Differences Between High and Low Anxious
Individuals.
Gina M. Manguno-mire
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Manguno-mire, Gina M., "A Novel Experimental Approach to the Explication of Information Processing
Differences Between High and Low Anxious Individuals." (2000). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses.
7158.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/7158

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has bean reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality o f th e
copy subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bieedthrough, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A NOVEL EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
TO THE EXPLICATION OF INFORMATION PROCESSING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW ANXIOUS INDIVIDUALS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment o f the
requirements for the degree o f
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
The Department o f Psychology

by
Gina M. Manguno-Mire
B.S., Louisiana State University, 1993
M A ., Louisiana State University, 1996
May 2000

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number 9963953

___

®

UMI
UMI Microform 9963953
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table o f Contents
List o f Tables.................................................................................................................

iv

List o f Figures................................................................................................................

v

Abstract...........................................................................................................................

vi

Introduction.....................................................................................................................

1

Review o f Empirical Literature....................................................................................
Attentional Bias-----------Lexical and Affective Decision Tasks................................................
Selective Attention or Pre-Attentive Bias?.....................................................
Dichotic Listening Tasks.....................................................................
Masked Stimuli.....................................................................................

4
4
5
12
13
14

Explanatory Models.......................................................................................................
Bower’s Associative Network Theory............................................................
W illiams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews’ Model o f Attentional Bias
Ohman’s Model o f Fear and Anxiety..............................................................

17
17
20
22

Overview o f Experiment...............................................................................................

26

Pilot Data........................................................................................................................
Method...............................................................................................................
Participants...........................................................................................
Apparatus and Stim uli.........................................................................
Procedure..............................................................................................
Results...............................................................................................................
Awareness Check..................................................................................
Subliminal Effects.................................................................................
Category Validation.............................................................................
Response Bias.......................................................................................
Anxiety Effects.....................................................................................
Decision Time.......................................................................................

28
28
28
29
30
35
36
36
37
38
40
45

Hypotheses.....................................................................................................................

49

Full Experiment.............................................................................................................
Method...............................................................................................................
Participants...........................................................................................
Apparatus and Stim uli.........................................................................

51
51
51
53

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Task A (Affective Categorization Task)..............................................
Task B (Pathfinder Task)......................................................................
Procedure..............................................................................................
Results.................................................................................................................
Task A (Affective Categorization Task)..............................................
Awareness Check......................................................................
Subliminal Awareness.............................................................
Proportion o f Correct Classifications......................................
Proportion o f Stim uli Categorized as “Dangerous”.............
Signal Detection Analysis........................................................
Decision Time...........................................................................
Task B (Pathfinder Task)......................................................................

53
55
56
57
57
57
58
59
61
65
74
76

Discussion........................................................................................................................

79

References........................................................................................................................

95

Appendix A: Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SAD)..............................................

101

Appendix B: Pilot Words and Category Assignment..................................................

102

Appendix C: Social Neutral Category Generation Instructions..................................

103

Appendix D: Social/Non-Social Word Categorization Task......................................

104

Appendix E: Familiarity Rating Task...........................................................................

105

Appendix F: Emotionality Rating Task........................................................................ 106
Appendix G: General Experimental Instructions........................................................

107

Appendix H: Computer Task Instructions.................................................................... 108
Appendix 1: Participant Debriefing............................................................................... 110
Appendix J: Affective Categorization Task W ords..................................................... I l l
Appendix K: Pathfinder Task W ords...........................................................................

112

V ita..................................................................................................................................

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

List o f Tables
1. Word Categorization Rating Data............................................................................

31

2. Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses in the Subliminal
Presentation Condition......................................................................................

41

3. Mean Proportion o f Correct Classifications in the Subliminal
Presentation Condition......................................................................................

45

4. Demographic Characteristics o f the Total Sample..................................................

52

5. Average Hit Rate Proportion for Word Type by Presentation Duration and
Anxiety Level.....................................................................................................

60

6. Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Words by Presentation Condition
and Anxiety Level.............................................................................................

63

7. Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses by Presentation Duration and
W ord Type.........................................................................................................

64

8. Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Subliminal Stim uli by
Anxiety Level...................................................................................................

65

9. Average Response Bias (c) by Presentation Duration, Anxiety Level, and
Target/Distractor Comparison..........................................................................

73

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

List o f Figures
1. Anxiety by Word Type Interaction (Pilot Study)..................................................

43

2. Supraliminal Decision Time Data..........................................................................

47

3. Anxiety by Word Type Interaction (Full Study)....................................................

61

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Abstract
The information processing perspective o f cognition and emotion has been a fruitful area
o f research inquiry in recent years. As a result o f this recent spate o f interest, emotional
processing biases in anxiety have been consistently demonstrated, indicating that anxious
individuals possess a processing priority for threatening information. This study is an
attempt to further examine the processing biases which characterize anxious and
nonanxious individuals. Pilot work was conducted to investigate the utility o f a novel
approach, the affective categorization task, to examine the affective meaning o f lexical
stimuli. Pilot research using the affective categorization task with socially anxious
individuals suggested that socially anxious participants exhibited a tendency to evaluate
subliminally presented threatening information more accurately than nonanxious
participants. Nonanxious individuals were more accurate in detecting the affective
content o f neutral and positive information. Furthermore, socially anxious participants
took longer to make affective decisions to emotional information, regardless o f valence,
than did nonanxious individuals. Based on that preliminary data, a second and more
complete experiment was conducted to replicate and extend those findings with generally
anxious individuals. A secondary aim o f the full study was to explore the relationship
between affective categorizations and underlying associative network representations.
Overall, results from the affective categorization task were quite sim ilar to those obtained
in pilot work. Anxious individuals evidenced an enhanced ability to correctly classify
subliminally presented threatening information, whereas, nonanxious participants
demonstrated an enhanced ability to correctly classify subliminally presented information
vi
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that was neutral or positive in affective tone. Signal detection analyses, however,
indicated that these results were primarily due to a response bias, or tendency for anxious
participants to categorize all subliminally presented information as threatening. Such a
bias in responding was not observed in nonanxious participants. There were no
differences in decision tim e to emotionally valent information between anxious and
nonanxious individuals. Additionally, contrary to expectations, no group differences
were found in network representations using the Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990)
methodology. Implications will be discussed in terms o f information processing theories
o f emotion and cognition.

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Introduction
Psychologists and theorists have been interested in the field o f emotion since the
inception o f psychology. Exploration into the nature o f the human emotional response
has led to increased understanding o f this m ultifaceted phenomenon. Emotions can best
be conceptualized as products o f biological, cognitive, and behavioral components. I do
not wish to debate the relative importance o f each component process in the experience o f
emotion, rather, I wish to simply acknowledge that the experience o f emotion is complex
and m ultiply determined. The proposed research project will focus on emotion from a
cognitive inform ation processing perspective.
In recent years there has been an explosion o f research into the cognitive
component o f emotion. Much o f that research has employed laboratory techniques
borrowed from experimental psychology. Basic research on emotion conducted using
em pirical approaches in the laboratory has offered significant contributions to the
conceptualization and treatment o f emotion and its disorders (W illiams, W atts, MacLeod,
& Mathews, 1997).
Research conducted from the information processing perspective on the nature o f
cognition in anxiety has established basic differences between anxious and nonanxious
individuals in the areas o f perception, attention, judgm ent, the prediction o f future events,
and the estim ation o f risk (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review o f relevant findings).
The current project is based primarily on prior research examining basic perception and
the processes involved in the evaluation o f the affective content o f words. Therefore, it

1
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deals indirectly w ith such issues as perception and attention at both strategic and
automatic levels o f processing. The second component o f the proposed project is
concerned with the representation o f information in long-term memory. Predictions
based on network theory (Bower, 1981; 1987) indicate that anxious and nonanxious
individuals should have different structural knowledge representations for threatening and
nonthreatening information. Network differences are frequently invoked to explain the
existence o f cognitive biases, although to date no reported study has directly examined
semantic network structures for threatening information in anxious and nonanxious
individuals.
To summarize, a general aim o f the proposed research project is to augment the
extant em pirical literature on emotion by examining the manner in which anxious and
nonanxious individuals process information that is threatening or nonthreatening in
nature. I plan to make a unique and significant contribution to that ample body o f work
by examining a slightly different cognitive process, the affective categorization o f
emotional stim uli. I propose to investigate the manner in which anxious and nonanxious
individuals make affective decisions under conditions o f both conscious and automatic
processing. In addition, I intend to compare performance on the affective categorization
task to underlying structural knowledge representations which are purported by some
theorists (Beck, 1976; Bower, 1981) to be the basic architecture o f cognition. This is the
first attem pt in the anxiety literature to empirically link the theoretical predictions derived

2
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from network-based theories o f emotion to demonstrable differences in a particular
component o f information processing.

3
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Review o f Empirical Literature
Throughout the past several decades, information processing paradigms have been
increasingly utilized to investigate the nature o f emotion. That work has yielded
numerous im portant findings which have heavily influenced the conceptualization o f the
human emotional response and disorders o f emotion, most notably anxiety and
depression. As the literature on cognitive biases in anxiety and depression is rather
extensive, the focus o f the current discussion w ill be lim ited to information processing in
anxiety, as that is the domain relevant to the proposed study. In addition, an exhaustive
description o f each research study conducted in all domains o f information processing
(attention, interpretation/judgment, risk estimation, and memory) will not be presented.
Rather, findings in pertinent areas will be briefly delineated to provide a general
framework for the present discussion. Greater attention w ill be paid to those aspects o f
the overall findings that bear on the tenets o f the proposed study. I will also choose to
focus extensively on the several experimental methodologies (i.e., lexical and affective
valence decision paradigms and subliminal processing) that are directly related to the
proposed methodology. Relevant theoretical models underlying much o f the research on
cognition and information processing that are pertinent to the proposed research project
will also be described in considerable detail.
Attentional Bias
Clinically, it can be observed that anxious clients have a tendency to exhibit a
heightened perception of, and vigilance for, threat and danger cues in the environment
4
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(Beck & Emery, 1985). Experimental evidence using a variety o f information processing
paradigms (e.g., Stroop task, dichotic listening, visual dot-probe detection, lexical
decision) has confirmed the existence o f such attentional biases for threat in anxious
individuals (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review). An attentional bias towards
threatening cues has consistently been demonstrated when there is a competition for
attention between threatening and nonthreatening stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata,
1986; see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, for a cogent review). Additionally, it has been
reported that nonanxious individuals have a tendency to shift their attention away from
threatening information towards positive information, also known as a “positivity bias in
normals” (MacLeod, et al., 1986).
Lexical and Affective Decision Tasks
Empirical data regarding lexical decision tasks using emotional stimuli will be
discussed, as basic information about word recognition is pertinent to a discussion o f how
emotions influence visual perception and is related to more complicated psychological
processes, such as similarity judgments and word categorization. According to
Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Setterlund (1997), low-level cognitive processes, like lexical
decisions and word recognition, provide the input for later stages o f information
processing and are important components to consider in an investigation o f the manner in
which emotion may influence the perception o f lexical meaning.
Although methodological problems plagued early studies on the influence o f
emotion on lexical decisions, later studies have demonstrated that individuals take

5
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slightly longer to make lexical decisions to unpleasant or threatening words compared to
pleasant or neutral information (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review). As those
findings suggested that the affective qualities o f a stimulus could influence basic lexical
analyses o f a word, researchers began to examine the interaction o f the mood state o f the
individual and the affective properties o f a stimulus.
Balota and Chumbley (1984) and Chumbley and Balota (1984) have offered an
explanation o f the findings that some semantic characteristics o f a word may influence
lexical decision prior to full lexical access. They postulated a two-stage model in which
the first stage involves a global analysis o f the meaningfulness and familiarity based on
the orthographic characteristics o f a letter string. According to the model, letter strings
with a high degree o f familiarity and/or meaningfulness should produce quick lexical
decisions. Letter strings o f low familiarity or meaningfulness result in quick “nonword”
decisions. On the basis o f their model, it can be inferred that the greater meaning a word
has, the more likely it is that the meaning will be available before a lexical decision is
made (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989). When meaning becomes available, the individual is
able to make an evaluative decision (e.g., pleasantness-unpleasantness rating) about the
word. According to Hill and Kemp-Wheeler, anxious individuals may have the meaning
o f threatening words available sooner than nonanxious individuals and should therefore
make quicker decisions about the affective quality o f such words. Mathews (1990) has
also described such a process and offered similar predictions. In addition, data from
network models would predict facilitation o f lexical decisions when the content o f the

6
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presented information matched the mood o f the perceiver. Although early attem pts by
Mathews to demonstrate processing biases using the lexical decision methodology in
anxious individuals met with little success, adaptations to the basic lexical decision task
paradigm have been fruitful in investigating processing differences between anxious and
nonanxious individuals.
M atthews, Pitcaithly, and Mann (1995) examined lexical decisions to positive,
neutral, and negative words using a stimulus priming paradigm. Participants included 86
undergraduate students who were selected based on measures o f neuroticism and mood
state. Target words were either preceded by an associated prime or the uniformative term
“blank”. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), or elapsed time between the prim e and
the target, was varied to reflect SOAs o f both short (240 ms) and long duration (1500
ms). Short SOAs (<300 ms) index the automatic spread o f activation between the units
for prime and target words. Long SOAs (>300 ms), reflecting expectancy priming, are
typically thought to require controlled processing and demonstrate an individual’s
voluntary attem pt to generate associates o f the prime. Overall, the evidence for mood
congruent priming differences in neurotic individuals was scant and, in fact, were only
observed in individuals who had relatively extremely negative moods. Specifically,
results indicated that at both priming durations, neurotic individuals showed enhanced
priming (i.e., faster decision tim es) for neutral information compared w ith low neurotic
individuals. When only those individuals in extreme moods were compared, results
indicated that for individuals in extremely negative moods, negative words were more
7
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strongly prim ed at both SOAs. Additionally, in individuals endorsing extremely positive
moods, there was also a trend toward enhanced priming o f positive words at short SOAs.
Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989) exam ined decision tim es for both lexical and
affective decisions in a group o f high and low anxious undergraduate students. Stimuli
employed in both the lexical and affective decision tasks were “pleasant” and
“unpleasant” words. “Unpleasant” words were rated as, “...having connotations o f either
physical threat or threat to self esteem” (p. 1145). In the lexical decision task, participants
decided whether letter strings were words or nonwords, hi the affective decision task,
individuals were required to indicate whether a letter string was a pleasant or unpleasant
word. The dependent variable in both tasks was reaction tim e for a lexical or affective
decision. Results indicated no differences in lexical decision tim e to threatening and
nonthreatening words between high and low anxious individuals. In the affective
decision task, no differences were detected between high and low anxious participants in
decision tim e for threatening words; however, low anxious individuals evidenced
significantly shorter decision tim es than high anxious individuals for affective decisions
to pleasant words.
Failures to find enhanced detection for threat words in anxious individuals using
standard lexical decision tasks have been reported by Mathews (1990) and MacLeod and
Mathews (1991). Those failures, which have presented interpretive problems for lexical
access and network models, have been conceptualized by Mathews and colleagues as
indicating that processing biases are not universal and point to the need for innovative

8
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methodological paradigms. Mathews has stated that, “...we suppose that anxiety is
associated primarily with an attentional bias that accords priority to threatening
information. When the task involves only one stimulus, as in the lexical decision task,
there are unlikely to be group differences, because in the absence o f competition,
attentional priority becomes irrelevant” (p.463). As such, research by MacLeod and
Mathews and Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, and May (1991) demonstrated that when
stimulus strings were presented simultaneously in pairs on the computer screen, anxious
individuals displayed relative speeding o f lexical decisions for emotionally negative
stimuli. Those findings suggest that elevated anxiety may be associated with a
heightened tendency to prioritize the encoding o f emotionally negative information, rather
than with an overall increase in the speed or efficiency with which such information is
processed (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). According to Mathews (1988), “Thus,
whenever there is competition for cognitive resources, anxiety is associated with the
assignment o f a high priority to processing threat-related information” (p.281).
Therefore, it appears that attentional bias in anxiety can be demonstrated using lexical
decision paradigms only under specific methodological considerations.
Green and McKenna (1996) implemented a semantic judgm ent paradigm to
investigate the nature o f attentional bias in highly trait anxious individuals. Participants
included high and low anxious undergraduate students. The semantic judgm ent task
consisted o f a procedure in which participants were presented a series o f sentences with a
gap indicating a missing word. After a variable delay, a single word (positive, negative,
9
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or neutral) appeared below the sentence. Individuals in the experiment were required to
decide whether if the word was inserted into the gap in the sentence, it would constitute a
semantically correct statement. Results indicated that highly trait anxious individuals
made semantic judgments about affectively negative words faster than they did for neutral
words. Participant groups did not differ in the speed with which they made semantic
judgm ents for positive words.
Mathews and M ilroy (1994) reported a study examining affective decisions in
anxious individuals. According to those authors, although prior research using a single
stimulus presentation o f the lexical decision task methodology has failed to produce
speeding o f lexical decisions for mood congruent information, “Theoretical
considerations, and some data, suggest that such mood-congruent speeding effects should
be more apparent in affective decisions” (p.535). In a series o f studies, Mathews and
M ilroy investigated that hypothesis by examining valence decisions to negative (e.g.,
funeral, stupid) and positive (healthy, clever) words. In their first experiment, 10
individuals who worried excessively and 10 nonanxious controls were used as
participants. In the first part o f the experiment, participants judged 60 supraliminally
presented emotional words as “good” or “bad” in meaning. Following that task,
participants were presented the 60 words from the first part o f the experiment and 60
“new” words subliminally (33 or SOms presentation + a random letter mask). Participants
pronounced the words if possible, guessed, or said “no” if they were unable to guess. In
the last part o f the experiment, individuals made “good” or ‘bad” valence decisions to the
10
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“new” words presented in the second part o f the experiment. Results indicated that all
participants were slower for “bad” decisions, however, there were no significant group
effects. There were nonsignificant trends in the data indicating that control participants
showed enhanced speeding for previously presented positive words, whereas, anxious
individuals demonstrated a trend towards enhanced speeding for threatening words.
The second and third experiments were conducted to further investigate the
generally null results o f the first experiment, although neither employed subliminal
presentation durations. The second experiment using another group o f 10 anxious and 10
nonanxious individuals was designed to investigate whether greater initial processing o f
stimuli was necessary to facilitate subsequent valence decisions, h i that experiment,
participants first made either word length decisions (“short” or “long) or affective valence
decisions (“good” or “bad”) to a series o f affective words. In the test phase, participants
were required to make either the same decision as during encoding, or a decision not
made previously. Again, group differences failed to emerge. The third experiment was
designed to require individuals to rely more on emotional meaning, rather than potentially
overleamed rote information regarding valence, and employed a slightly different
experimental task. Ten anxious and 10 nonanxious individuals participated in the
experiment. Individuals read aloud a series o f words and were required to decide which
o f two positive or negative words was more semantically related to the target word. For
example, the positive associate and matched nonassociate for the target word “praise”
were “deserved/delicious” and the negative pair was “false/famine”. Once again, no

11
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differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals were demonstrated. The authors
interpreted their overall findings, which were contrary to predictions from both relevant
theories and research data, as potentially reflecting different components o f cognitive
processing. They stated, “Threatening stimuli m ay be selected (or rejected) at a relatively
early and automatic stage o f processing, not necessarily involving the consciously
controlled operations that are required to report an affective judgm ent “ (p.550).
However, A. Mathews asserts that, “...there should be congruent valence sensitivity
differences prior to awareness if we could find the right measure to detect them ...”
(personal communication, December 3, 1998).
Selective Attention or Pre-Attentive Bias?
Another issue relevant to the proposed study is the nature o f the processing biases
found in anxious individuals. Do differences in cognitive processing reflect the operation
o f conscious, voluntary strategies or alternatively, are more automatic, involuntary
mechanisms at work? Although automatic processes are usually considered involuntary,
effortless, and operating outside o f awareness, research has demonstrated that there are
instances in which some but certainly not all o f these characteristics apply (Bargh, 1989).
Researchers have only recently begun to attem pt to disentangle these and other complex
questions, although that work has produced some consistent general findings to date.
Seminal work by Marcel (1983) has demonstrated that individuals process backwardly
masked target stimuli for meaning, even though conscious perception o f the targets is
precluded. Using subliminal emotional stimuli, numerous examples can be found o f
12
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emotional priming effects related to the affective quality o f the subliminal stimulus on
subsequent responding (see McNally, 1995, for a cogent review). Presently, most
researchers would agree that at least some o f the mechanisms involved in the processing
o f emotional stimuli are automatic (Mathews, 1990). Various paradigms have been
utilized to examine the influence o f information presented outside o f conscious
awareness. Specific approaches have included dichotic listening tasks, briefly presented
or degraded stimuli, and masking procedures.
Dichotic l istening Tasks
In dichotic listening tasks, individuals are instructed to attend to information
presented auditorially in one channel, while sensitivity to information being presented in
an unattended channel is measured. The data has consistently demonstrated that anxious
individuals are prone to the effects o f threatening material, even when that information is
not consciously detected. For example, Burgess, Jones, Robertson, Radcliffe, and
Emerson (1981) presented agoraphobics, social phobics, and controls with two different
prose passages, one to each ear, and had them shadow (repeat aloud) one passage while
ignoring the other. Anxiety-disordered individuals, but not controls, detected more
threatening targets than neutral targets in the unattended passage. Foa and McNally
(1986) have demonstrated that individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder have an
enhanced ability to detect words associated with dirt or contamination than controls, an
effect that disappeared after successful treatment. Work by Mathews and MacLeod
(1986) indicated that anxious individuals, but not control participants, were significantly

13
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slower on a reaction tim e task in trials in which unattended threatening words were
presented.
Interference on secondary tasks or facilitation o f threat recognition in dichotic
listening paradigms has typically been interpreted to represent the occurrence o f
preattentive or nonstrategic processing. However, as Holender (1986) points out an
interpretive difficulty w ith such a conclusion is that rapid voluntary shifts in attention
between channels cannot be ruled out. As a result, subsequent efforts to exclude the
influence o f strategic processing have relied on the presentation o f m asked stim uli which
participants cannot consciously report (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).
Masked Stimuli
The use o f masked stimuli have been employed prim arily in the sublim inal
emotional Stroop paradigm. The basic Stroop task is a measure o f attentional deployment
in which individuals are required to name the color in which a word is printed while
ignoring the color word itself. It has been consistently shown that individuals take longer
to name the colors o f the words when the words are antagonistic color names (e.g., “blue”
written in red ink). M odification o f the original Stroop paradigm, in which words
differing in affective content are to be color named by individuals in various emotional
states, has resulted in over h alf a century o f research indicating that the em otional state o f
the perceiver interacts with the affective quality o f the word. That work has consistently
demonstrated interference in color-naming for information that is relevant to the
individual’s primary area o f concern (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a cogent review).
14
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Stim uli in the Stroop task can either be presented at durations sufficient to allow
conscious processing or at subliminal durations to allow for automatic processing. In the
su b lim inal version o f the Stroop task, subliminally presented words are often presented in

combination w ith a pattern mask, which is a stimulus presented either before or after the
target stimulus, designed to prevent conscious awareness. In both subliminal and
supralim inal versions o f the emotional Stroop task, anxious individuals demonstrate

consistent interference in color naming when the target is threatening in nature.
Interference has been demonstrated w ith both clinical and nonclinical participants (see
Logan & Goetsch, 1993, for a comprehensive review).
The relationship o f threatening sublim inal stim uli and information processing in
anxious individuals has also been examined using masked pictorial stimuli. Ohman and
Soares (1994) using a forced-choice recognition, backward masking procedure
demonstrated that snake- and spider-fearful individuals experienced physiological
reactivity (elevated skin conductance response) to supraliminally and sublim inally
presented feared objects. Additionally, Ohman and Soares were able to demonstrate
content specificity o f the fear response, in that snake phobics demonstrated fear to
masked snake images, although not to other objects, and spider phobics exhibited fear to
masked images o f spiders only. Content specificity has not been demonstrated in verbal
forms o f subliminal Stroop tasks.
According to Mathews and MacLeod (1994), “It seems that the earliest
(preattentive) analysis o f stimulus meaning may serve only to classify stim uli as related to

15
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threat or not. More fine-grained analysis may be required before a match can be made
with current concern, leading to more specific interference effects” (pp.39-40). Mathews
(1997) has suggested that, “...all valenced stimuli are evaluated non-consciously, and if
the relevant decision mechanism is sufficiently activated, further resources w ill then be
directed to analyse it more fully....the early automatic detection o f potential threat can
eventually lead to more controlled processes being deployed, and appropriate action
taken” (pp.55-56). Automatic detection o f threat is a primary feature o f anxiety disorders
and anxious mood states. Several theoretical models have been developed which address
this feature o f cognitive processing and shed light on the complex interplay o f elaborative
and automatic processing mechanisms.
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Explanatory Models
Several theoretical models, although m ost notably network models o f emotion,
have spawned much o f the research to date investigating cognitive processing biases in
emotional disorders. It has become apparent, as research findings have accrued over the
past decade, that a network account o f emotion as initially proposed is insufficient to
accommodate the emerging data. As a result, modifications to basic network theory and
the emergence o f several alternative explanatory models have been offered to account for
the research data described heretofore.
Bower’s Associative Network Theory
A popular and oft-used framework to discuss the relationship between mood and
cognition is Bower’s (1981; 1987) associative network model. The theory originally
outlined by Gordon Bower in his seminal paper Mood and Memory published in 1981 and
extended in Bower and Cohen (1982), Gilligan and Bower (1984), and Bower (1987), has
generated a plethora o f research examining the basic tenets o f his proposal. The essence
o f Bower’s model is that human memory can be conceptualized as a large system o f
interrelated nodes or units representing ideas among “concepts, them es, and memories o f
events” (Bower, 1987). That interrelated structure is known as a semantic network and
represents an individual’s knowledge and beliefs about concepts and events. The spread
o f activation among related concepts is responsible for an analysis o f a concept’s meaning
and priming o f related concepts. Associative networks were originally detailed several
years earlier by Anderson and Bower (1973) and Collins and Lofhis (1975) to describe
17
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basic semantic concepts. Bower originally proposed the idea that em otions could also be
represented as distinct nodes within the network. Although the exact m echanisms have
not been specifically delineated, Bower asserts that emotion nodes have efferent
connections to related processes, such as, facial expressions, body posture, the autonomic
nervous system and viscera, to word labels for emotions, concepts describing emotions
and response patterns, to themes which provoke emotions, and memories o f events
associated with emotions.
In his original description o f a network theory o f emotion, Bower discusses how
the model accounts for several influences o f emotion on cognition. Those effects fall into
three general categories: 1) Mood-dependent retrieval, wherein memory retrieval is
enhanced when mood at encoding matches mood at retrieval; 2) M ood-congruity which
means when the affective significance o f stimuli matches the emotional state o f the
perceiver, enhanced attention, improved perception, and more elaborate processing
leading to enhanced memory will result; and 3) Emotional priming in which emotions
serve a top-down processing function that influences thinking, judgm ent, predictive
inferences, social impressions, and self-observation.
From Bower’s model, mood should influence the relative ability to retrieve
emotionally valenced information from memory and how readily em otional stim uli are
perceived. M ood congruent material should possess a correspondingly increased ability
to recruit selective attention, hi addition, comprehension processes should be biased by
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emotional state with mood consistent interpretations favored when information presented
is complex or ambiguous (MacLeod & Mathews, 1997).
Recently, researchers have attem pted to construct empirically derived depictions
o f associative network representations (see Schvaneveldt, 1990, for a review). That work
has employed the use o f basic structural models to generate graphic depictions o f
associative networks for semantic concepts. The concepts that com prise an associative
network are term ed “nodes” and links between nodes represent associations between
related concepts. According to Schvaneveldt, “The resulting networks have several
interesting properties and they have also proven to be useful in a variety o f applications”
(p.ix). Schvaneveldt and colleagues have developed a computer program, Pathfinder,
which generates network representations from psychological proximity data. That work
has illustrated the utility o f such an approach in the prediction o f academic performance,
the demonstration o f differences between novices and experts in relevant domains,
mapping geographic and spatial locations, priming paradigms, and memory research.
Recently, attempts have been made to employ the Pathfinder technique in the domain o f
emotion and cognition. That work has yielded significant differences in the associative
representation o f domain specific information between men and women (Geer, 1996;
Rabalais & Geer, 1992), between heterosexual men and women and gay men and women
(Manguno-Mire & Geer, 1998), in sub-clinical depression (M elton, 1995), and in patients
diagnosed w ith m ultiple chemical sensitivity (Gomez & Schvaneveldt, in press).
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Much o f the empirical research stimulated by Bower’s thought provoking model
has demonstrated significant limitations o f the theory. The model has difficulty
accounting for the inconsistency o f mood-dependent and mood-congruent retrieval,
although some o f the failures to replicate those effects could be considered a result o f
methodological factors (W ells & Matthews, 1994). In addition, the model has
encountered other problems. Network theory predicts that emotions should act sim ilarly
at all stages o f information processing (i.e., perception, encoding, retrieval, etc.) and does
not postulate different processes resulting from the experience o f different mood states.
However, it has been consistently demonstrated that attention is more easily captured by
negative mood-congruent material in anxious than in depressed individuals, while the
recall o f negative self-referent events is more prevalent in depression than in anxiety
(Mathews, 1988).
W illiams. Watts. MacLeod, and Mathews’ Model o f Attentional Bias
As a result o f the inherent lim itations o f Bower’s associative network theory,
alternative explanatory models have been developed. Many o f those models account for
the influence o f emotion on pre-attentive mechanisms and are therefore directly relevant
to the proposed study. Perhaps one o f the most fully developed alternatives to a strict
network interpretation is the model presented by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and
Mathews (1988). The uniqueness o f the model is that it distinguishes differing biases
associated w ith trait and state mood and locate them at different stages within an
information processing schematic o f attention and memory (W ells & Matthews, 1994). It

20

permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

views the effects o f anxiety as pre-attentive, serving to divert cognitive resources to
threatening stimuli in anxious individuals, whereas nonanxious individuals preferentially
allocate resources to nonthreatening stimuli.
The original version o f the W illiams, et al. (1988) model conceptualized two
distinct pre-attentive processing stages (Mathews & McKintosh, 1998). In the first stage,
the threat value o f a stimulus event is evaluated by an affective decision mechanism
(ADM). If the threat value is assessed at high enough levels, a secondary resource
allocation mechanism (RAM) is triggered. High levels o f trait anxiety lead to the
allocation o f attentionai resources towards the stimulus and low trait anxiety levels lead
to attention directed away from the threatening stimulus. Such a conceptual framework
predicts that anxiety should serve to influence perception and attention, as opposed to
elaborative processes like memory and conscious retrieval. The data on attentionai biases
in anxiety, in combination with the dearth o f support for memory biases in anxiety, lend
credence to that assumption. Another relevant tenet o f the model is that anxiety should
affect pre-attentive and automatic selection o f threatening material, but not post-attentive,
voluntary selection for threatening material. The data appear to be generally supportive
o f such a proposal, however, the model must account for the failures to find such biases
on measures o f simple encoding, such as perceptual thresholds, lexical decision, and
speed o f word reading (W ells & Matthews, 1994).
In fact, Williams and colleagues (W illiams, Mathews, & M acLeod, 1996;
W illiams, et. al., 1997) have modified their original conception o f the affective decision
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mechanism (ADM) to include a connectionist or parallel distributed processing network
having sim ilar effects. This “network” is slightly different from Bower’s associative
network model, however. The W illiams, et al. network proposes that the activation o f
units representing threatening stimuli are strengthened by an emotional “tag” which is a
result o f biological preparedness or prior learning history. “Threat-tagged” units have an
advantage over competing stim ulus units w ithin the network, and therefore autom atically
increase the chance that the resource allocation mechanism would be activated, leading to
attentionai bias. In the absence o f competition, no particular advantage would be
apparent, because a single threatening stim ulus would effectively control the network’s
output, regardless o f whether it carried a tag or not (W ells & Matthews, 1994). However,
clarification is needed about what an emotional ’’tag” is, how it is acquired, and exactly
how it leads to greater activation o f meaning units representing threatening information in
anxious individuals.
Q hm an’s Model o f Fear and Anxiety

Ohm an (1993) provides another relevant model o f anxiety and information
processing m echanism s. That model draws on evolutionary perspectives more heavily
than either o f the two models presented previously. Additionally, it is more directly tied
to the biological substrate responsible for autonomic activation in anxious mood states
than previous models. According to Ohman, fear and anxiety have evolved due to their
functional status in protecting people from potentially life-threatening situations. Other
types o f fears (e.g., social fears) that are less relevant to life and limb have developed as
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the result o f a dominance-submissiveness system which serves a primarily adaptive
function in the promotion o f social order by means o f facilitating the establishm ent o f
dominance hierarchies. Therefore, according to Ohman, fear and anxiety are rooted in
defensive responses that have been tied to contexts involving survival threats, either
directly or indirectly.
Ohman asserts that a perceptual system designed to effectively locate threat is an
essential component o f the system. As such, it is likely to be biased in the direction o f a
low threshold for discovering threat, since false negatives (failing to detect actual threat)
are more evolutionarily costly than false positives (detecting threat in the absence o f
actual threat). In addition, Ohman suggests that the discovery o f threat should rely on
early, parallel processing perceptual mechanisms, which define threat on the basis o f
relatively simple stimulus features.
Specifically, Ohman’s model is concerned with several information processing
mechanisms operating at distinctly different stages in the overall process. Incoming
stimulus information is first analyzed by feature detectors, which provide a preliminary
analysis o f the stimulus before the information is relayed to the significance evaluation
system. It is assumed that the feature detectors operate primarily on the physical
attributes o f a stimulus. At this initial stage, there is no interaction with long-term
memory and therefore no meaning is assigned to the stimulus. Consequently, in anxious
individuals, the cognitive system m ay be set to discover potential threat in the
environment and select certain stim uli for preferential treatment in later stages o f
23
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processing. Alternatively, highly threatening or biologically prepared stimuli may
activate autonomic arousal systems directly, without the need for further elaborative
processing.
The feature detectors send relevant stimuli on to the significance evaluator which
automatically assesses stimuli for relevance, sending relevant information on to a
“conscious perception system”. The conscious perception system allows a slower
conscious appraisal o f meaning via interaction with emotional memories stored in an
“expectancy system”. According to Ohman, the locus o f the threat bias is found at the
level o f the significance evaluator, however, the expectancy system clearly influences the
activation o f the significance evaluator. “Thus, as part o f interrelated memory systems,
memorial representations o f moods (Bower, 1981) or emotional responses (Lang, 1984)
may prime memory areas focused on threat; as a result, the expectancy system sets the
significance evaluator to respond to threat words, for example” (p.528). The conscious
perception system is also activated by the initial registration o f threat and may result in
competition with other tasks, thus accounting for the data on competition o f resources in
attentionai tasks. The expectancy system is highly dependent on the organization o f
emotion and memory and is conceptualized as an interrelated associative network
structure which can serve to bias the significance evaluator at a nonconscious level.
The present research is not an attempt to directly test specific features o f any one
model in particular. However, the previously described models were presented to provide
a theoretical framework for the present study and to assist in the generation o f testable
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hypotheses. All o f the models share some reliance on an associative structure o f semantic
memory and discuss autom atic and strategic processing o f information and therefore bear
directly on the current methodology.
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Overview o f Experiment
The current study aims to extend the research findings in the area o f threat-related
biases in information processing in anxious individuals. Prior work has indicated,
through both theoretical hypotheses and empirical data, that anxious and nonanxious
individuals differentially process information o f a threatening nature. That work has
moved beyond a general description o f the pattern o f emotional biases observed and
moved toward a delineation o f the specific mechanisms responsible for individual
differences in emotional responding. This study attempts to examine in detail one aspect
o f information processing, the evaluation o f information as threatening or nonthreatening.
I believe the current method is related to basic findings in both lexical and affective
decision paradigms. To date, those data have been somewhat inconclusive and further
work is needed to clarify the current state o f affairs. In addition, I would argue that the
affective categorization task taps more elaborative processes than simple word/nonword
judgm ents or positive/negative evaluations. By looking at the performance o f individuals
on this task under conditions o f both automatic and strategic processing, I hope to further
explore the mechanisms responsible for the production o f threat-related biases in anxious
individuals. By employing this novel paradigm, I hope to augment the extant literature
and aid in the conceptualization and understanding o f how individuals comprehend
information in their environment. An additional goal o f the current research is to relate
the findings obtained in the affective categorization task to the theoretical framework on
which such an approach is predicated. Associative representations o f long-term memory
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are often invoked in research o f this kind and this study is an attem pt to em pirically
examine the utility o f such a model.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through the Louisiana State University undergraduate
psychology research pool sanctioned by the University Committee on Research Involving
Human Subjects. The research project was approved by the Institutional Review Board
through expedited review. No one refused to participate in the experiment and all
students received extra course credit for participation. Fifty-three individuals
participated in the experiment. However, since a primary goal o f this study was to assess
individual differences in the ability to categorize subliminally presented stim uli, it was
necessary to ensure that participants demonstrated subliminal perception. Twenty o f the
original 53 participants met this criterion as measured by chance levels o f objective
performance on the lexical decision awareness trials. Furthermore, in order to assess trait
levels o f social anxiety, the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SAD; W atson & Friend,
1969), a 28-item paper and pencil measure which evaluates anxiety in general social
situations, was employed and is included in Appendix A. Individuals scoring above the
80th percentile (SAD = 16-17) were classified as high anxious (n=2). Those scoring
below the 20th percentile (SAD = 0-3) were classified as low anxious (n=7). Participants
were predominantly Caucasian (79 %) women (55 %), with an average age o f 22 years,
and 14.24 years o f education. To summarize, a total o f 53 participants completed the
study. O f those 53 participants, 20 met objective awareness criteria indicating subliminal
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perception, and o f those 20 individuals, 9 were classified as high (n=2) and low anxious
(n=7) by the SAD.
A pparatus and Stimuli

Stim uli display and data collection were conducted using MEL Professional
Program software (version 2.0; Schneider, 1988) on 1 o f 4 IBM-compatible PCs equipped
with a VGA-enhanced monitor. All PCs had standard refresh rates o f 14.3 ms. As
recommended by Schneider, tim ing checks were conducted on each com puter to ensure
uniformity and precision o f subliminal displays.
The task in the pilot study involved categorization o f subliminally and
supralim inally presented words. Stimuli were selected to represent nouns w ith
threatening, neutral, and positive meanings. Words were further categorized as socially
or nonsocially related in order to investigate how socially anxious individuals responded
to self-relevant information. This resulted in a total o f three word categories w ith 40
words in each category. H alf o f the words in each category were related to social
concerns and h alf were nonsocial. Please refer to Appendix B for a list o f stim uli and
word categorization. Words included in the experiment were selected from the available
research literature and supplemented by additional pilot work. Threatening and positive
words were selected from research by MacLeod, et al. (1986) and Mathews and MacLeod
(1985; 1986). Neutral social words were not readily available from the extant research
literature and consequently were generated by raters blind to the purposes o f the present
experiment. Appendix C contains the instructions for the social neutral word generation
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task. Nonsocial neutral words were categorized household items used in prior research
(Geer & Manguno, 1994). A total o f 222 words was generated through these methods.
In order to establish that the identified words accurately represented their
respective word categories and to obtain ratings o f word frequency, three separate classes
o f undergraduate psychology students at Louisiana State University served as blind raters.
Please refer to Appendices D-F for the specific task instructions for the three rating tasks.
Each class o f students performed one o f the following rating tasks: 1) Placing the words
into social and nonsocial categories; 2) Rating the words on a seven-point Likert scale for
word fam iliarity; 3) Rating the words on a seven-point Likert scale for emotionality.
Table 1 contains the data regarding the three rating tasks. In order to be categorized as a
social or nonsocial word, interrater agreement for each word had to be greater than or
equal to 75%, although category agreement was generally much higher. Threatening
words were defined as words characterized by a strong negative emotional valence rating
(M = 2.12, SD = .34). Positive words were rated by participants as evoking strong
positive emotion (M = 6.1, SD = .35). Neutral words were those which reflected the
approximate m idpoint o f the emotionality rating scale (M = 4.4, SD = .33), defined as
“neither positive nor negative”.
Procedure
The purpose o f the pilot phase o f the current project was to determine whether a
novel experimental paradigm, based upon earlier work by Mathews and M ilroy (1994),
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Table 1
Word Categorization Rating Data

Rating Data

Social/Non-Social %

Word Type

M

SD

Word Length

M

SD

Emotionality

Familiarity

M

SD

M

SD

Threat
Social

87.45

6.8

7.95

2.63

2.21

.32

5.75

.38

Non-Social

92.25

7.2

7.75

1.37

2.03

.35

5.61

.48

Social

93.45

4.92

7.95

2.74

4.6

.38

6.25

.38

Non-Social

90.1

6.41

7.8

1.2

4.1

.27

5.81

.71

Social

92.2

5.59

7.85

2.08

5.9

.33

6.17

.43

Non-Social

84.92

8.26

7.45

2.44

5.86

.36

6.0

.71

Neutral

Positive

Note. Emotionality ratings were made using a 1 (very strong negative) to 7 (very strong
positive) scale. Familiarity ratings were made using a 1 (not at all familiar) to 7
(extremely familiar) scale.
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would be a useful empirical framework to explore differences in affective decisions to
emotionally relevant stim uli between anxious and nonanxious participants.
Participants were seated at an DBM computer term inal and read general
instructions for the experimental task by a trained research assistant. These instructions
are contained in Appendix G. Participants were informed that the prim ary task in the
experiment was to classify words presented on the computer screen as either “dangerous”
or “safe”. Dangerous words were defined as those that were threatening in meaning,
whereas, safe words were defined as those which were nonthreatening in meaning.
Participants were also informed that the categorization task was subjective and that they
should respond with the answer that “seems best”. Individuals began the experimental
trials after reading additional instructions presented on the computer screen, indexed in
Appendix H, and completing a series o f practice trials.
In each experimental trial, a fixation cross (+) was presented at the center o f the
visual display for a duration o f 1000 ms. Following a blank screen lasting for 500 ms, a
one-word stimulus in lowercase letters was presented in the same place as the fixation
cross. In the experimental task, each word was presented on two occasions, once
supraliminally (300 ms) and once subliminally (14 ms), in a novel random order
generated for each subject by MEL Professional (Schneider, 1988). Immediately
following the offset o f a subliminal stimulus, a mask consisting o f a series o f asterisks
equivalent to the number o f letters in the stimulus word appeared in the sam e location
(e.g., table/***"1*). Following the offset o f the stimulus word or the mask, a response
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query displaying the correct response keys appeared and remained on the screen until the
participant responded, followed by a blank screen lasting 500 ms. An individual’s task
was to press a key to signify a “danger” response if they decided the word was threatening
and to press a key to signify a “safe” response if they decided the word was
nonthreatening. Response keys were counterbalanced across participants, so that for half
o f the participants the ‘z ’ key represented a “danger” response, while the V’ key
represented a “safe” response, and for the other half o f participants the ‘z’ key represented
a “safe” response and the 7 ’ key represented a “danger” response.
In order to familiarize participants with the affective categorization task, ten
practice trials were presented prior to the experimental trials. The num ber o f practice
trials was selected based on a review o f the literature examining studies using subliminal
processing (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, W illiams, &
Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Kentish, & Bradley, 1993) and from pilot testing. In previous
work, 20 practice trials were utilized. Feedback elicited from participants indicated that
the number o f practice trials should be decreased significantly, therefore ten practice trials
were selected for use in the actual pilot study. Stimuli used in the practice trials were
novel stim uli that were not duplicated in either the experimental trials or the awareness
trials. The sequence o f events in the practice trials was identical to the experimental
trials, except that participants received feedback on the accuracy o f their decisions.
Feedback to participants consisted o f visual accuracy feedback denoting either a “Correct
Response” or a “Wrong Response” which was displayed on the computer screen
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immediately after participants made a categorization decision. Following 10 practice
trials, participants were instructed to inform the experimenter if they were unsure o f any
aspect o f the experimental task. None o f the participants expressed a lack o f
understanding o f the mechanics o f the affective categorization task. As the practice trials
were designed only to familiarize individuals with the experimental task, practice data
were not analyzed.
Each participant made a total o f 240 responses in the affective categorization task.
Stimuli were presented in a random order in two equivalent blocks o f 120 words. These
experimental blocks were counterbalanced across participants. Individuals received a
short break between experimental trials in order to reduce the possibility o f fatigue
effects.
Following completion o f the categorization task trials, an objective awareness
check was presented. Awareness checks are standard in the subliminal literature and
necessary to ensure that participants are not consciously aware o f subliminally presented
information. Participants were required to make lexical decisions to 48 subliminally
presented words and nonwords. The 24 word stimuli were selected from the 6 categories
o f words presented in the affective categorization task and were equated on word length,
emotionality, and familiarity. Nonword stimuli were 24 categorized animal words
scrambled to render them unpronounceable and were equated with words on word length.
As in the experimental task, subliminal stimuli were presented for 14 ms followed by a
backward pattern mask consisting o f a series o f asterisks. In h alf o f the trials a word was
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presented and in half o f the trials a nonword was presented. Participants decided whether
a word or nonword had been presented by pressing the appropriate key on the computer
keyboard. For half o f the participants the ‘z’ key represented a word and the 7 ’ key
represented a nonword. For the other h alf o f participants, the ‘z’ key represented a
nonword response and the 7 ’ key represented a word response. As in the affective
categorization task, individuals were presented 10 practice lexical decision trials with
visual accuracy feedback (“Correct Response’7”Wrong Response”), followed by 48
lexical decision trials. As in the categorization task trials, practice trials were not
included in data analysis.
Immediately following completion o f the awareness trials, participants completed
the SAD (W atson & Friend, 1969). All questions were answered and feedback on the
experimental task was elicited from participants. Individuals were then appropriately
debriefed as indicated in Appendix I, thanked for their participation, received extra course
credit, and excused from the experiment.
Results
The purpose o f the pilot experiment was to determine the utility o f the affective
categorization task methodology in examining the effects o f anxiety on information
processing. As these data are exploratory in nature, analyses are lim ited to an
examination o f relevant questions and trends in the data will be discussed. The
limitations and cautions o f such an approach are noted. As such, these preliminary results
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need to be replicated in the full study in order that more confidence may be placed in the
overall findings and the implications derived from them.
Awareness Check
Average correct performance for the lexical decision awareness trials across all S3
participants was 67%. This value was significantly higher than would be expected by
chance, t (52) = 8.81, p = .001, and therefore reflected potential awareness o f subliminal
stim uli. As the experimental predictions are predicated on the assum ption o f processing
without objective awareness, it is necessary to exclude those participants that actually
demonstrated awareness o f subliminally presented stimuli. As a result, only those
participants (n = 20) who demonstrated levels o f awareness that were not significantly
different from chance were included in an analysis o f the data, t (19) = 1.5, p = .15 (M =
.51, SD = .04).
Subliminal Effects
As the primary hypotheses o f the present experiment are based on the assumption
that individuals evidence subliminal processing o f emotional stim uli, an analysis
examining the ability o f individuals to correctly classify subliminal stim uli into
appropriate categories was conducted. Consequently, this analysis used data from the
chance criterion participants only (n=20). Recall that these participants were selected
because they were no greater than chance in correctly classifying w hether a subliminally
presented stimulus was a word or a nonword. If individuals were able to classify words
into appropriate categories at better than chance levels o f performance, it is reasonable to
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conclude that participants were able to discern the affective valence o f the stim uli, even at
presentation durations too b rief to allow conscious processing o f the word; thereby,
dem onstrating sublim inal perception o f the emotional content o f the stim ulus. The
primary dependent variable in this analysis was hit rate (HR) and represented the correct
classification o f a word as dangerous (threatening) or safe (nonthreatening). Threatening
social and nonsocial words were considered threatening based on their negative affective
properties and a response o f “danger” to these words was considered a correct
classification or hit. Neutral (social and nonsocial) and positive (social and nonsocial)
words were considered nonthreatening based on the emotionality rating data and a “safe”
response to these words was classified as a hit. The average HR for participants
collapsed across all six word categories was 62% (SD = .16). This was significantly
greater than would be expected at chance levels o f performance, t (19) = 3.27, j> = .004,
indicating that participants were able to determine some o f the affective qualities o f the
word in making their categorizations. These data demonstrate that it is possible for the
affective properties o f a stimulus to be discerned, even at very brief presentation
durations, and lend credence to the assumption that individuals in the pilot experiment
demonstrated subliminal processing o f emotional stimuli.
Category Validation
An exam ination o f the correct classification or hit rate (HR) for supraliminally
presented words using the 20 chance criterion participants was also conducted to provide
an independent verification o f the classification o f the words used in the affective
37
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categorization task. The average correct classification across word categories in the
supraliminal condition was 90% (SD = .05), demonstrating that participants agreed with
the operational definition o f lexical stimuli. Participants fairly uniformly evaluated the
terms operationally defined as threatening to be “dangerous” and the term s operationally
defined as nonthreatening to be “safe”. These results serve as a basic manipulation check
and provide support for the construct validity o f the stimuli employed in the present
experiment.
Response Bias
In order to investigate the effects o f social anxiety on the categorization o f
emotional words, separate analyses were conducted on the affective categorization task
data from the subset o f nine high and low socially anxious participants. Before moving to
a discussion o f the main findings related to anxiety effects, it is necessary to examine the
possibility that the results o f the present study may have been influenced by response
bias. As it has been consistently demonstrated that anxious individuals have a general
tendency to interpret threat in the environment (Williams, et al., 1997), particularly when
faced with ambiguous cues (Constans, Penn, Omen, & Hope, 1999), such individuals may
be predisposed to make a “danger” or “threat” response to subliminaOy presented stimuli,
regardless o f the true meaning o f stimuli. Since response bias mechanisms could be
proposed to account for any observed differences between anxious and nonanxious
participants, exploratory attempts were made to examine such a phenomenon.
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In order to exam ine the response bias alternative, the proportion o f “danger”
responses in the subliminal condition across all word categories was examined. If
anxious individuals exhibit a general response bias for threat, they should evidence a
higher proportion o f “danger” responses across ail subliminally presented words,
regardless o f the affective properties o f the word. Alternatively, if anxious individuals
are reluctant to make a “danger” response, then they should evidence a lower overall
proportion o f “danger” responses. To examine these competing alternatives, a 2 X 2 X 3
Repeated Measures analysis using the GLM procedure in SPSS for Windows was
conducted. The between-subjects variable was SAD Score (high vs. low) and withinsubjects variables were Social/Nonsocial categorization and W ord Type (threat, neutral,
and positive). The dependent variable for this analysis was the proportion o f danger
responses given by each participant. Results yielded a significant interaction between
Anxiety Level and Social/Nonsocial categorization, F (1,7) = 5.73, jj = .048, although
means analyses were not significantly different. The pattern o f results indicated that high
socially anxious individuals made a higher proportion o f danger responses to both social
(M = .52, SD = .22) and nonsocial words <M = .64, SD = .30) com pared to low anxious
individuals CM = .35, SD = .24; M = .31, SD = .21). As can be observed from an
inspection o f group means, this effect was slightly enhanced in the nonsocial word
category. In addition, it should be noted that this effect was qualified by a marginally
significant triple-order interaction among Anxiety Level, Social/Nonsocial categorization,
and Word Type, F (2,14) = 4.68, j> = .06. Univariate analyses conducted to follow up the
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significant overall interaction indicated that high anxious participants had a marginally
significant tendency to evaluate threatening nonsocial words as dangerous compared to
low anxious participants, F (1,8) = 4.82, j> = .064. Surprisingly, this effect was not found
for threatening social words, F (1,8) = .23, p = .645. As an inspection o f the proportion o f
danger responses for each category provided in Table 2 indicates, it appears that socially
anxious individuals m ade a slightly higher proportion o f threat responses to all subliminal
stimuli compared to nonanxious participants. However, except for the nonsocial threat
category, the tendency for anxious individuals to make a “danger” response could hardly
be considered overwhelming. Although the predisposition for anxious individuals to
make a threat response to subliminal stimuli is enhanced relative to nonanxious
individuals, the absolute proportion o f danger responses is considerably less for neutral
and positive inform ation than it is for threatening information. Therefore, it does not
appear that anxious individuals indiscriminately responded w ith a threat response to all
sublim inally presented information. A signal detection analysis, including an objective

index o f response bias, appears necessary in order to accurately determine the
mechanisms responsible for the apparent tendency o f anxious individuals to categorize all
ambiguous stim uli as threatening.
Anxiety Effects
In order to investigate differences between high and low anxious participants, the
primary aim o f the proposed study, the proportion o f correct classifications or hit rate
(HR) was examined. A 2 X 2 X 2 X 3 Repeated M easures analysis o f variance
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Table 2
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses in the Subliminal Presentation Condition

Social Dimension

Social

Low Anxious
Word
Type

M

SD

Non-Social

High Anxious

Low Anxious

High Anxious

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Threat .51

.31

.63

.04

.44

.28

.90*

.07

Neutral .27

.23

.47

.25

.28

.25

.55

.57

Positive .26

.30

.47

.39

.21

.17

.47

.24

Note. * High anxious participants differ from low anxious participants at p = .06.
(ANOVA) using the GLM procedure o f SPSS for Windows was performed and included
one between-subjects variable, SAD Score (high vs. low), and three within-subjects
variables, Presentation Duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal), Social Categorization
(social vs. nonsocial), and Word Type (threat, neutral, and positive). There was a main
effect o f Presentation Duration, F (1, 7) = 30.65, p = .001, indicating a higher proportion
o f correct classifications in the supraliminal compared to the sublim inal condition (M =
.92, SD = .06; M = .64, SD = .14, respectively). This finding was not unexpected and
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simply indicates that participants were more accurate in classifying information presented
at conscious levels o f awareness.
There was also a significant interaction between Anxiety Group and the
Social/Nonsocial dimension, F (1,7) = 8.19, p = .024. Paired comparisons revealed no
statistically significant differences between group means, however, the pattern o f means
indicated that low socially anxious individuals evidenced a slightly higher hit rate for
social words compared to high socially anxious individuals, (M = .80; SD = . 11; M = .74;
SD = .07, respectively), whereas, high socially anxious individuals evidenced a slightly
higher hit rate for nonsocial words compared to low socially anxious participants (M =
.80, SD = . 10; M = .76, SD = .08, respectively). This was in contrast to the a priori
assumption that socially anxious individuals would more accurately detect the threatening
content o f socially relevant information.
A marginally significant interaction also emerged between Anxiety Level and
Word Type, F (2,14) = 3.27, j> = .068. Paired comparison analyses, including
Bonferroni’s corrections, revealed no significant differences between means. However,
the pattern o f means, as evidenced in Figure 1, demonstrated that for words with a
threatening content, high anxious individuals evidenced higher hit rates, whereas, for
positive (nonthreatening) words, low anxious individuals evidenced higher hit rates. The
proportion o f correct classifications by high and low anxious participants for neutral
words was identical. This finding, although not statistically significant, could be taken to
indicate that anxious individuals are more accurate in detecting threat-related content and
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that nonanxious individuals are more accurate in detecting information that is
nonthreatening or positive.

Figure 1
Anxiety by Word Type Interaction
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0.85
0

s*

3 0.8
i

*

075

0.7
0.65

Threat

Neutral
Word Type

low anxious

Positive

high anxious

Figure 1. Anxiety bv Word Type Interaction (Pilot Study)
A univariate ANOVA was also conducted to further examine the results o f the
overall repeated measures analysis. Significant differences in HR between high and low
anxious participants for supraliminally presented neutral social words, F (1, 7) = 10.29, p
= .015 and for subliminally presented threatening nonsocial words, F (1, 7) = 4.82, p =
.064 were found. An inspection o f cell means indicated that high anxious participants
made relatively fewer correct classifications o f neutral social words than did participants
low in social anxiety when information was displayed at presentation durations which
allowed conscious processing o f information (M = .80, SD = .14; M = -96, SD = .04,
respectively). Recall that a neutral word was classified as correct if it was categorized as
“safe”. Socially anxious participants categorized a greater number o f socially neutral
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words (e.g., conversation) as threatening. Neutral social words were purposely selected
for their ambiguity and it is not surprising that socially anxious individuals may have
viewed neutral socially relevant information as threatening. However, it should be noted
that this finding was simply a relative difference and, in fact, socially anxious participants
classified over 80% o f words in the neutral social category as nonthreatening. As an
inspection o f the cell means in the subliminal condition presented in Table 3
demonstrates, participants in the low anxious group exhibited approximately chance
levels o f HR performance for subliminally presented nonsocial threatening information,
whereas, participants in the high anxious group demonstrated significantly higher HRs for
subliminally presented threatening nonsocial information. Interestingly, the expected
difference between high and low socially anxious participants in the classification o f
socially threatening information did not emerge statistically, although an inspection o f
group means yielded a slight trend in that direction. Anxious individuals appear to have
an enhanced ability to detect threatening content at a subliminal level (both compared to
neutral and positive information and compared to low anxious participants). This
enhanced threat detection does not seem to be specific to socially threatening words and
could perhaps indicate a more general threat effect not evident in low anxious individuals.
High anxious participants were at chance levels o f HR accuracy when the classification o f
neutral and positive information was evaluated. The opposite pattern emerged in low
anxious participants. Low anxious individuals evidenced a higher proportion o f correct
responses when classifying neutral and positive information and demonstrated chance
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levels o f performance in making affective judgments o f threatening information. These
data are consistent with findings o f other researchers (Taylor & Brown, 1988) who have
demonstrated a positive interpretation bias in nonpathological individuals.
Table 3
Mean Proportion o f Correct Classifications in the Sublim inal Presentation Condition

Social Dimension

Non-Social

Social

Low Anxious

High Anxious

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

.31

.63

.04

.44

.28

.90

.07

Neutral .73

.23

.53

.25

.72

.25

.45

.57

Positive .75

.30

.53

.39

.79

.17

.53

.24

Word
Type

M

Threat

.51

SD

Low Anxious

High Anxious

Note. * High anxious participants differ from low anxious participants at p = .06.
Decision Time
Although an examination o f decision time (DT) was not the primary aim o f the
pilot study, it is germane to the overall experimental hypotheses and will be discussed
briefly. A preliminary investigation o f DTs was undertaken to determine whether the
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current methodology would yield group differences and therefore be a useful dependent
variable to consider in the proposed study. A 2 (SAD Score) X 2 (Presentation Duration)
X 2 (Social Categorization) X 3 (Word Type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the
GLM procedure o f SPSS was employed, similar to the analyses discussed previously.
The dependent variable in this analysis was the time it took participants to make a
danger/safe response on the computer keyboard. All response latencies were measured in
milliseconds. Based on recommendations by Mathews and Milroy (1994), responses less
than 100ms and greater than or equal to 3 standard deviations above the mean were
considered response outliers and were excluded from data analysis. Results indicated no
significant within-subjects effects o f Presentation Duration, F (1,7) = 3.64, p = .098 or
Social/Nonsocial dimension, F (1,7) = 3.33, p = .111. There was a significant overall
effect o f SAD score, F (1,7) = 15.08, p = .006, indicating that high anxious individuals
demonstrated longer overall decision times compared to low anxious participants (M =
769, SD = 30; M = 515, SD = 88). However, this effect was qualified by a trend toward a
three-way interaction among SAD Score, Presentation Duration, and Social/Nonsocial
categorization, F (1,7) = 4.48, p = .072. Figure 2 displays the average DT for each word
category. Results indicated that socially anxious individuals, when compared to
nonsocially anxious individuals, took longer to categorize supraliminally presented
emotional words, both positive and negative. The same pattern was observed for words
with both social and nonsocial dimensions. High and low anxious participants did not
significantly differ in categorization time for neutral words. There were no significant
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differences observed for DT in the su b lim inal presentation condition. Therefore,
preliminary evidence exists demonstrating that the emotional qualities o f a stimulus
differentially affect the speed with which anxious and nonanxious individuals make
strategic congruent categorizations.

Figure 2
Supraliminal Decision Time Data
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Figure 2. Supraliminal Decision Time Data
In summary, results from the pilot study indicate that the proposed affective
categorization task methodology appears to be useful in examining differences between
high and low anxious individuals in the evaluation o f threatening and nonthreatening
information. I was able to demonstrate subliminal perception o f affectively salient lexical
information. Data from the pilot study was largely consistent with prior research from an
information processing perspective and indicated that anxious individuals were more
accurate in categorizing subliminally presented threatening information as threatening,
whereas nonanxious individuals demonstrated an enhanced ability to classify subliminally
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presented nonthreatening information as nonthreatening. Differences in categorization
time were also noted between anxious and nonanxious participants. High anxious
individuals took longer to categorize both positive and threatening supraliminally
presented emotional words. These results merit further exploration in order to replicate
and extend these findings, so that an understanding o f the manner in which anxious
individuals process emotional information may be augmented. Therefore, the preliminary
results obtained from the pilot study appear to be a useful starting place and also point to
several modifications that may improve the current methodology. These changes will be
explicated in the method section o f the full experiment. Through an examination o f the
relationship between network meaning structure and affective categorization data, useful
insight into the mechanisms proposed to underlie the basic processing o f emotional
information may be revealed. Specific hypotheses to be investigated in the full study are:
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Hypotheses
1) Subliminal processing o f the affective content o f words will be demonstrated.
2) Group differences should emerge between high and low anxious participants in
the classification o f content specific information. High anxious individuals should
demonstrate an increased ability to classify subliminally presented threatening
information. Low anxious individuals should demonstrate an enhanced ability to classify
subliminally presented positive information. Theoretically, no differences should be
apparent in the classification o f neutral information or nonwords, although pilot data
suggests that low anxious participants may have an increased ability to classify
subliminally presented neutral information.
3) Differences in sensitivity or response bias measures would be expected
between anxious and nonanxious individuals for threatening information. If, as expected,
an enhanced ability to detect threatening content by anxious individuals is found,
differences in the ability to discriminate threat-related fiom nonthreat-related content
would be evidenced by an enhanced sensitivity measure in anxious individuals.
Alternatively, if differential hit and false alarm rates are observed, it could be due to a
general tendency for anxious individuals to make a threatening response to barely
perceptible stimuli and would be reflected by a greater index o f response bias across all
classes o f stimuli.
4) Reaction time differences would be expected, although two different
predictions could be made. From a strictly theoretical perspective, speeding would be
49
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predicted for anxious individuals for threatening information. However, data
demonstrating that finding is equivocal and in fact, pilot data suggests, that anxious
individuals are slowed in their decisions to emotional information both for threatening
and positive information.
5) Differences in network complexity should be apparent between high and low
anxious individuals. High anxious participants should have more complex networks,
with more links on threatening terms than low anxious subjects. In contrast, individuals
low in anxiety should have more complex networks, with more links on positive terms
than high anxious individuals.
6) With regard to the relationship between the affective categorization task data
and network complexity, there are several predictions that could be made. Assuming that
differences in network complexity are demonstrated, I would expect to find a positive
relationship between hit rate and network complexity. Two alternative predictions could
be made regarding decision time data and network complexity, however. Theoretical
considerations would predict a negative relationship between decision time and network
complexity. Alternatively, if response bias mechanisms or attentional capture is
responsible for slowed decision times to affectively salient stimuli, then a positive
relationship could be observed between affective decision times and network complexity.
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Full Experiment
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited in the identical manner as in the pilot study. They
were students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses at Louisiana State University
who speak English as their primary language. A total o f 538 participants was screened
for participation in the experiment using the Trait form o f the STAI (Spielberger, 1977), a
frequently utilized index o f general levels o f anxiety with excellent psychometric
properties (Fisher & Corcoran, 1994). STAI scores ranged from 21 to 67 with an average
score o f 39.5 (9.65). Two hundred sixteen students, 108 high anxious and 108 low
anxious, were eligible for participation in the study, as their score on the STAI placed
them in the top or bottom 20% o f all participants. Attempts were made to contact by
telephone 150 o f the possible 216 eligible participants to schedule the computer portion
o f the experiment. O f the 133 students that were actually contacted, 5 were excluded
because English was not their primary language and 16 declined to participate.
Accordingly, a total o f 112 students were scheduled for the computer portion o f the
experiment. One hundred participants actually completed the entire experimental
protocol. Data was excluded from two participants due to missing or incomplete data.
Therefore, the total sample consisted o f 98 individuals (50 low anxious and 48 high
anxious). Table 4 contains the demographic characteristics o f the total sample. As an
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inspection o f Table 4 reveals, there were no significant differences between groups on
any demographic variable.
Table 4
Demographic Characteristics o f the Total Sample

Participant Group

Low Anxious

High Anxious

STAI-Trait

26 (2.3)

55 (4.9)*

STAI-State

28 (7.6)

50 (10.3)*

Age

20(2)

20 (2.5)

36%
64%

29%
71%

80%
14%
6%

92%
2%
6%

Gender
Men
Women
Race
Caucasian
African-American
Other

Note. Chi-square and univariate analyses for demographic variables did not significantly
differ between groups. * Low and high anxious participants significantly differed on
average Trait, F (1,97) = 1424.53, j> < .001, and State score, F (1, 97) = 139.30, p < .001.
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Apparatus and Stimuli
Two computer tasks (Task A and Task B) were presented to all participants in a
fixed order. Task A was presented first in order to limit potential awareness o f
subliminal stimuli. Both o f the computer tasks were presented on 1 o f 3 IBM PCs
equipped with a VGA-enhanced monitor. Task A consisted o f the affective
categorization task employed in the pilot study with several slight modifications, whereas,
Task B was a similarity judgment task, utilizing the computer program Pathfinder
(Schvaneveldt, 1990).
Task A (Affective Categorization Task)
The affective categorization task employed in the full experiment is essentially
identical to the task used in the pilot study. It was employed to investigate how generally
anxious individuals make decisions about the semantic content o f emotionally valent
information. The subject’s primary task was to categorize subliminally and
supraliminally presented individual words as “dangerous” or “safe” by pressing
designated response keys (“z” and “/”) on the computer keyboard.
Based on the pilot data collected, three modifications were applied to the current
methodology. In prior work, the three word categories (threat, neutral, and positive) were
subdivided into social and nonsocial dimensions. Analysis o f that data revealed few
relevant group differences with respect to the social/nonsocial variable. Consequently,
the social/nonsocial distinction was dropped from the complete experiment. The stimuli
employed in the present study was selected from the original set o f words rated for the
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pilot experiment. Forty words from the threat, neutral, and positive word categories were
chosen. All word categories were equated for word length, familiarity, and emotionality
where feasible. In addition, twenty nonwords were included in order to further assess
issues o f response bias. The nonword category consisted o f categorized clothing items
(e.g., sweater) that were scrambled to render them grammatically incorrect and
semantically meaningless (e.g., eawster). Nonwords were matched for word length with
the three word categories. Please refer to Appendix J for the experimental stimuli that
were presented in the affective categorization task. Additionally, the entire list o f words
was subdivided into two lists, List 1 and List 2, which were equated on relevant variables.
This methodological change was included to address the enhanced lexical decision
awareness observed in the pilot study and has been used by previous researchers (Bradley,
et al., 1995; Mogg, et al., 1993a). Since in the pilot study, stimuli were presented in a
random order on two occasions (once supraliminally and once subliminally), it is possible
that participants demonstrated increased awareness due to stimulus priming. Therefore,
in the foil experiment, half o f the participants were presented List 1 subliminally and List
2 supraliminally. The other half o f participants were presented List 1 supraliminally and
List 2 sublim inally. Based on recommendations by Fox (1996), supraliminally and
sublim inally presented words were presented in a random order.

Following a series o f 10 practice trials, participants made a total o f 140 affective
categorizations. Subliminal presentations included 20 words from each o f the 3 word
categories and 20 nonwords, for a total o f 80 subliminally presented stimuli.
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Supraliminal presentations included 20 words from each o f the 3 word categories, for a
total o f 60 word presentations. A lexical decision awareness check followed the affective
categorization task and, unlike in the pilot study, employed a novel set o f stimuli selected
from the word categories used in the affective categorization task. In half o f the trials a
word was presented and in half o f the trials a nonword was presented. A participant’s
task was to press a response key to indicate a word or nonword decision. A series o f 10
practice trials preceded the 48 subliminal awareness trials. Practice data were not
analyzed.
Task B fPathfinder Task)
In order to examine high and low anxious individuals’ structural knowledge
representation for threatening and nonthreatening information, the Pathfinder
(Schvaneveldt, 1990) methodology was employed. Pathfinder is a computer program that
is based on complex mathematical algorithms rooted in graph theory that generates
associative networks based on estimates o f conceptual distance between concept pairs
(Dearholt & Schvaneveldt, 1990). By using both the affective categorization task and the
Pathfinder task, direct comparisons were possible between the categorizations that high
and low anxious individuals made regarding threatening and nonthreatening information
and the underlying knowledge structure o f domain-specific information.
In the Pathfinder task, participants were presented 153 word pairs on a computer
screen. All stimuli and data collection was conducted through the use o f the Pathfinder
computer program (Schvaneveldt, 1990) on an IBM PC. An individual’s task was to
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press a number on the computer keyboard reflecting a similarity rating for each o f the
word pairs. A nine point Likert scale was used, with higher scores reflecting greater
perceived similarity. The words employed in the Pathfinder task were a subset o f the
words presented in the affective categorization task. There were six words in each
category (threat, neutral, and positive) for a total o f 18 words. Nonwords were not
included, as they have no relevance for meaning concepts generated by Pathfinder. All
word categories were equated on word length, familiarity, and emotionality where
feasible. Appendix K contains the stimuli used in the Pathfinder task.
Procedure
Participants were screened using the STAI (Spielberger, 1977) in a large group
format. Individuals who scored above the 80th percentile were classified as high anxious
participants and those who scored below the 20th percentile were classified as low anxious
participants. High and low anxious participants were contacted by a research assistant,
who was blind to group assignment, in order to schedule the computer portion o f the
experiment. Once participants arrived at the laboratory they read and filled out an
informed consent form and provided limited demographic information (age, gender, and
race). Participants read detailed instructions presented on the computer screen prior to
beginning the experiment. All participants performed the affective categorization task
first followed by the Pathfinder task. Following completion o f the computer tasks,
individuals completed the State Form of the STAI (STAI-S). Following completion o f
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the STAI-S, participants were appropriately debriefed, thanked for their participation,
given extra course credit, and excused.
Results
Task A (Affective Categorization Task)
Awareness Check. All analyses were conducted using the statistical software
package, SPSS for Windows. The awareness check comprised 48 subliminally presented
lexical decision trials (LDT) which followed the affective categorization task trials. The
LDT were included to evaluate whether participants demonstrated awareness o f
subliminal stimuli. The average correct performance for the total sample was 54%. This
value was significantly higher than would be expected by chance, t (98) = 4.53, p < .001.
As a result, additional analyses were conducted in order to identify a subset o f
participants that did not evidence awareness of subliminal stimuli (i.e., LDT performance
below chance levels). Seventy-three participants met this criterion (36 low anxious and
37 high anxious). Average lexical decision awareness performance for this subset o f
participants was 51% and did not significantly differ from chance, t (72) = .76, p = n.s..
Consequently, subsequent analyses included only this subset o f participants whose
objective awareness o f subliminal stimuli was at chance levels o f performance. The
participants did not differ from the total sample with regard to any demographic variable.
In order to examine whether the modifications to the methodology o f the full
study (i.e., stimuli presented once subliminally and once supraliminally in the affective
categorization task and a novel set o f stimuli employed in the LDT) resulted in a
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significant reduction in lexical decision awareness compared to the pilot study, an
independent samples t-test was conducted employing the average lexical decision correct
performance for the total sample o f participants in each study. Overall lexical decision
awareness was significantly reduced in the full study compared to the pilot study, t (149)
= 6.44, p < .001 (M.= .54, SD = .10; M = -67, SD = .14, respectively).
Subliminal Awareness. As the tenets o f the current study bear on a demonstration
o f subliminal processing o f affective stimuli, an examination o f the ability o f individuals
to correctly classify subliminally presented lexical stimuli was carried out. An average
proportion o f the correct classification o f threat, neutral, and positive words, the overall
hit rate, was the dependent variable in this analysis. For the purposes o f this analysis,
threat words were considered correctly classified if a response o f ‘danger’ was given.
Neutral and positive words were considered correctly classified if a response o f ‘safe’ was
given. Nonwords were not included, as there is no truly objective criterion by which to
classify meaningless stimuli. A one-sample t-test was performed comparing the average
correct classification for subliminally presented words against chance performance (test
value = .50). Results collapsed across all 73 participants indicated that the average
correct performance, 61% (.10), was significantly greater than chance, t (72) = 8.50, p <
.001. As such, it appears that individuals were able to discern some quality or
characteristic o f these stimuli which allowed them to make affective categorizations o f
very briefly presented information correctly, despite their inability to make word/nonword
judgments at better than chance levels.
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Proportion o f Correct Classifications. The dependent variable in this analysis was
the proportion o f correct classifications o f words or the hit rate (HR) calculated for each
participant. In this analysis, categorization o f a threatening word as “dangerous” and
categorization o f a neutral or positive word as “safe” were considered ‘hits’. A 2 (low vs.
high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive word type)
Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was performed. A main effect o f
Presentation Duration was found, F (1, 71) = 687.82, j> < .001, indicating a higher
proportion o f correct classifications in the supraliminal presentation condition compared
to the subliminal condition (M = .92, SE = .01; M = .60, SE = .01, respectively). A main
effect o f Word Type, F (2, 142) = 9.93, j> < .001, was also noted. Paired comparisons,
including Bonferroni’s corrections, demonstrated that positive words had the highest HR
compared to threat and neutral words, which did not differ (M = .80, SD = .11; M = .74,
SD = .11; M = .74, SD = .10, respectively). Both main effects must be interpreted in light
o f two significant interactions. The second-order interaction o f Anxiety and Word Type,
F (2, 142) = 7.72, g = .001, is most informative, and the results o f univariate analyses are
depicted in Figure 3. Results demonstrate that when considering both presentation
durations, high anxious participants have higher hit rates for threatening words, whereas,
low anxious participants have higher hit rates for neutral and positive words. Univariate
analyses conducted to examine the significant triple-order interaction among Anxiety,
Duration, and Word Type, F (2,142) = 3.2, p = .04, are highlighted in Table 5. In the
subliminal presentation condition, results follow the pattern previously described (i.e.,
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high anxious participants demonstrate higher HRs for threat words and low anxious
participants demonstrate higher hit rates for neutral and positive lexical stimuli). A
slightly different pattern was observed in the supraliminal presentation duration
condition, however. When lexical stimuli are presented supraliminally, high and low
anxious participants differ only slightly in the correct classification o f positive words.
Table 5
Average Hit Rate Proportion for Word Type bv Presentation Duration and Anxiety Level

Presentation Duration

Subliminal

Low Anxious
Word
Type

M

Supraliminal

High Anxious

SD

M

SD

Low Anxious
M

High Anxious

SD

M

SD

Threat

15

21

62*

Al

^88

AO

^91

tfT

Neutral

.66

.17

.55** .18

.87

.13

.89

.09

.17

.59*** .20

.03

.96****.05

Positive

.68

.99

Note. Within presentation duration, high anxious and low anxious participants differ at:
*F (1, 72) = 3.72, b = .058; **F (1, 72) = 7.59, e = .007; ***F (1, 72) = 4.14, e = .046;
****F (1, 72) = 6.44, £ = .013.
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Figure 3
Anxiety by Word Type Interaction
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Figure 3. Anxiety bv Word Type Interaction (Full Study)
Proportion o f Stimuli Categorized as “Dangerous”. The present analysis was
conducted to examine the overall proportion o f “danger” responses to lexical stimuli. An
examination o f these data allows direct comparisons with the results o f the pilot study and
underscores the need to examine these data using a signal detection analysis in order to
confirm the initial impressions reached by an inspection o f these results. The dependent
variable in these analyses was the average proportion o f “danger” responses to all stimuli
calculated for each participant. The within-subjects independent variables were
Presentation Duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal) and Word Type (threat, neutral,
positive). Anxiety Level (low vs. high) was the only between-subjects independent
variable. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat,
neutral, positive word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was
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performed. A main effect o f Presentation Duration was found, F (1, 71) = 28.99, g <
.001, indicating a greater proportion of danger responses in the subliminal presentation
condition compared to the supraliminal condition (M = .45, SE = .02; M = .35, SE = .01,
respectively). A main effect o f Word Type, F (2, 142) = 994.85, g < .001, was also noted.
Paired t-tests, including Bonferroni’s corrections, demonstrated that collapsed across
subliminal and supraliminal presentation durations, threatening words had the highest
proportion o f danger responses compared to neutral and positive word categories, which
also differed significantly from each other (M = -74, SD = .11; M = .26, SD = .10; M =
.20, SD = 1 1 , respectively). All paired comparisons were significant beyond the g = .001
level. This analysis simply indicates that, as expected, all individuals categorized
threatening words as dangerous significantly more often than all other words. Neutral
words were also categorized as dangerous slightly more frequently than positive words,
although the overall difference was relatively modest. A main effect o f Anxiety Level
was also noted, F (1, 71) = 8.92, g = .004, indicating that anxious individuals categorized
all subliminally and supraliminally presented lexical information as dangerous more often
than nonanxious individuals (M = .43, SE = .01; M = .37, SE = .01, respectively), similar
to results obtained in the pilot study. This effect could potentially signify a response bias
toward danger in anxious individuals and will be examined in greater detail using signal
detection parameters. All o f these main effects must be interpreted in light o f two
significant interactions, however. An interaction was observed between Presentation
Duration and Anxiety Level, F (1, 71) = 4.38, g = .04. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2
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(subliminal vs. supraliminal) ANOVA was conducted to follow up the results o f the
significant interaction and indicated that anxious individuals made a significantly greater
proportion o f “danger” responses in the subliminal condition only, F (1, 72), = 7.40, j> =
.008. Please refer to Table 6 for a depiction o f group means by condition. There was also
an interaction between Presentation Duration and Word Type, F (2, 142) = 468.48, p <
.001. The results o f paired comparisons, including Bonfenoni’s corrections, are
contained in Table 7. The proportion o f “danger” categorizations was greater for all
subliminally presented categories o f lexical information compared to all categories o f
supraliminally presented information, with the exception o f the threat word category.
Table 6
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Words bv Presentation Condition and
Anxiety Level

Anxiety Level

Low

High

Duration

M

SD

M

SD

Subliminal

.40

.15

.50*

.15

Supraliminal

.34

.07

.35

.05

Note. *p = .008
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Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses bv Presentation Duration and Word Type

Presentation Duration

Supraliminal

Subliminal

Word Type

M

SD

M

SD

Threat (HR)

.58

.19

.89*

.09

Neutral (FAR)

.40

.18

.12** .11

Positive (FAR)

.37

.19

.03*** .04

Note. HR = Hit Rate; FAR = False Alarm Rate. Presentation Duration values differ at: *t
(72) = -12.82, £ < .001; **t (72) = 10.99, £ < .001; ***t (72) = 16.80, £ < .001.
As anxious individuals differed primarily in the proportion o f danger responses to
subliminal stimuli, an additional ANOVA was performed to examine whether this effect
was consistent across all classes o f stimuli. Categorization o f nonwords was included in
this analysis, so that an examination o f a tendency to classify all subliminally presented
stimuli could be investigated. Refer to Table 8 for group means as a function o f word
category. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 4 (threat, neutral, positive, nonword) ANOVA
was conducted and indicated that anxious individuals made a significantly higher
proportion o f “danger” categorizations to all lexical stimuli. The nonword condition was
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not statistically significant, although the trend remained similar. These data are
consistent with pilot results and suggest that anxious participants could be demonstrating
a response bias, or tendency to categorize sublim inally presented information as
threatening. In order to further elucidate this hypothesis, a signal detection analysis o f
these data was performed.
Table 8
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Subliminal Stimuli bv Anxiety Level

Low Anxious

High Anxious

Word Type

M

SD

M

SD

Threat (HR)

.53

.21

.62*

.17

Neutral (FAR)

.35

.17

.46** .18

Positive (FAR)

.32

.17

.41*** .20

Nonword

.45

.17

.49

.18

Note. HR = Hit Rate; FAR = False Alarm Rate. High and low anxious participants differ
at: *F (1, 72) = 3.72, p = .058; **F (1, 72) = 7.59, p = .007; ***F (1, 72) = 4.14, p = .046;
****F( 1, 72) = 6.44, p = .013.
Signal Detection Analysis. Signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) is a
theory originally presented in the human factors literature to describe the ability o f
individuals to decipher a stimulus from extraneous background information. It has been
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applied recently in the anxiety and recognition memory literature with mixed results.
Mogg, Mathews, and Weinman (1989) and Mathews and MacLeod (198S) failed to find
recognition biases in anxious individuals using a signal detection analysis. However,
recent work by Windmann and Kruger (1998) and Brown, Kosslyn, Breiter, Baer, and
Jenike (1994) have demonstrated differences, albeit in both response bias and sensitivity
measures, in panic patients and OCD patients, respectively.
A signal detection analysis was conducted to take into account the proportion o f
“danger” responses in the categorization o f stimuli. In the lexicon o f signal detection
theory, a “danger” response to a threat word is considered a ‘hit’ and a “danger” response
to a neutral or positive word is considered a ‘false alarm’. The utility o f signal detection
theory is that it provides corrected measures o f hit and false alarm rates, considering the
independent contribution o f each for a target class o f stimuli. The raw hit and false alarm
rates are converted to standardized units which are then plugged into two general
formulas provided by Macmillan and Creelman (1991). These formulas produce two
independent measures o f the individual’s ability to recognize, or in the case o f the present
experiment, categorize different classes o f stimuli. One o f the measures, sensitivity, or
d’, is an index o f the ability to discriminate between two classes o f stimuli and is
represented by the formula (d’ = z(H) - z(F)). Theoretically, d’, can range from 0 to
infinity, although practically speaking d’ rarely exceeds a value o f 4.65. A d ’ = 4.65
would indicate perfect discriminability in which hit rates are 100% and the false alarm
rate is 0%. When sensitivity is high, the individual is very likely to detect the accurate
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meaning o f a stimulus (i.e., categorize threatening words as “dangerous” and
nonthreatening words as “safe”) and less likely to make a mistake (i.e., categorize
threatening words as “safe” and nonthreatening words as “dangerous”). Conversely, a d’
o f 0 represents practically equivalent hit and false alarm rates in which individuals are
unable to discriminate stimuli at all. Moderate performance would be reflected by d ’ = I .
Signal detection theory also computes a measure o f response bias, or c (criterion),
which represents a criterion-based decision that an individual uses to recognize or classify
stimuli. It can reflect the predisposition o f an individual to respond in a certain manner or
tendency to favor one response over another. The measure, c, is produced by the general
formula (c = -0.5 [z(H) + z(F)]). Theoretically, c is presumed to range from negative
infinity to positive infinity, although in practice, c values typically range from -1 to +1. A
criterion o f 0 reflects no bias on the part of the observer. Positive values reflect a
conservative criterion in which hit and false alarm rates are minimized; whereas, negative
values represent a liberal criterion in which hits and false alarms are maximized. It is
particularly important in an evaluation o f the data from the affective categorization task to
rely on an approach that takes into account both hit and false alarm rates, so that the
underlying mechanisms responsible for differences in those parameters can not only be
described, but understood in greater detail.
A computer program for the generation o f parametric (d' and c) and
nonparametric (A ’ and bnbd) signal detection measures using SPSS for Windows was
provided by J. Hicks (personal communication, November 8, 1999), following the
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recommendations o f Macmillan and Creelman (1991). First, in order to determine
whether parametric or nonparametric signal detection measures should be included in
data analysis, the distribution o f hit and false alarm rates for the subliminal and
supraliminal conditions were graphed. As all four distributions were normally
distributed, parametric measures were appropriate and used in subsequent analyses. Two
separate 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (threat/neutral vs.
threat/positive comparisons) Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed using the
computer-generated parametric signal detection parameters (d’ and c) for each participant
as separate dependent variables. The threat/neutral and threat/positive comparison
independent variable represents the distribution o f hit and false alarm rates for target
stimuli in relation to other stimuli, referred to as distractor stimuli. In the present
experiment, threatening stimuli are considered ‘targets’ and neutral and positive stimuli,
considered separately, are referred to as ‘distractors’. Signal detection theory can only
determine sensitivity and response bias parameters by considering the ability o f
participants to detect a class o f target stimuli in relation to other stimuli. Nonwords are
not included in the analyses o f signal detection data, as there is no meaningful way o f
classifying nonword stimuli. As such, hit and false alarm rate data cannot be reliably
computed and without those data, a signal detection analysis cannot be performed.
Accordingly, all signal detection comparisons include lexical stimuli only.
Sensitivity, indexed by the parameter, d’, was the first dependent variable
considered and a resultant main effect o f Presentation Duration, F (1, 71) = 964.42, g <
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.001, was observed. An exam ination o f condition means revealed that sensitivity was
significantly higher in the supralim inal condition compared to the subliminal condition

(M = 2.74, SE = .05; M = .50, SE = .06, respectively).

When sensitivity is high,

individuals are very likely to detect the accurate meaning o f a stimulus and to categorize
stimuli accurately. Not surprisingly, when stim uli are presented at sufficient duration
lengths, individuals are better at making categorization decisions. A main effect o f
Target/Distractor Comparison was also noted, F (1, 71) = 61.16, g < .001. Collapsing
across presentation duration, an examination o f group means revealed that overall
discriminability for threatening target stimuli compared to positive distractors was higher
than threatening targets compared to neutral distractors (M = 177, SD = .41; M = 1.47,
SD = .41, respectively). Although significant differences were observed among classes o f
stimuli and between presentation durations, no group differences in sensitivity were noted
on the primary independent variable o f interest, anxiety level.
Sensitivity was also computed for the lexical decision task data in order to
validate the designation o f participants as demonstrating subliminal awareness. If the
objective measure o f lack o f awareness o f subliminal stimuli, defined as chance
performance on the lexical decision task awareness trials, is a reasonable measure o f a
lack o f conscious awareness o f stimuli, d ’ for lexical decision performance should be 0,
indicating no ability to discriminate. Therefore, a univariate ANOVA was conducted to
examine d ’ between participants deemed at chance levels o f performance on the lexical
decision awareness trials and those deemed to perform at better than chance levels o f
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awareness. Sensitivity (d*) was computed from the overall hit and false alarm rates for
word/nonword discrimination trials. A “word” response to a word was classified as a
‘hit’ and a “word” response to a nonword was classified as a ‘false alarm’. There was a
significant overall effect, F (1, 97) = 74.10, p < .001, indicating that, as expected,
participants demonstrating chance levels o f performance on the LDT task had
significantly lower estimates o f d’ than individuals who performed at above chance levels
(M = .04, SD = .30; M = .86, SD = .64, respectively), indicating reduced discriminative
ability. In order to examine whether the discriminative ability o f chance participants was
truly nil, a one-sample t - test was conducted for the average d’ index for this subset of
individuals (test value = 0). The discriminative ability o f “chance” participants was not
significantly different from 0, t (72) = 1.11, p = n.s., however, the ability o f participants
who were classified at above chance levels o f performance in their ability to discriminate
words from nonwords was significantly higher than 0, t (24) = 6.77, p < .001. These
results indicated that according to sensitivity measures, chance participants evidenced no
ability to discriminate words from nonwords, whereas, participants who were above
chance levels o f performance evidenced an apparent ability to discriminate words from
nonwords. These results were compared to overall d’ measures computed for “chance”
participants for the affective categorization task data in the subliminal presentation
condition. The overall d’ for threat/neutral words was .46 (.51) and for threat/positive
words was .54 (.57). Both o f these values were significantly greater than 0, t (72) = 7.62,
p < .001; t (72) = 8.08, p < .001, respectively. These results indicate that participants
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included in the study were unable to discriminate subliminally presented words from
nonwords in the lexical decision awareness trials, although they were able to discriminate
the affective content o f sublim inal words in the affective categorization task. Results
from signal detection analyses further support the demonstration o f the subliminal
processing o f the affective content o f information.
The second measure derived from signal detection formulas is c, a parametric
index o f response bias. Significant effects were noted for all independent variables,
including the group difference variable, anxiety level, on this measure. Results o f the 2
(low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (threat/neutral vs.
threat/positive comparisons) Repeated Measures ANOVA indicated a main effect o f
Target/Distractor comparison, F (1, 71) = 61.16, p < .001. An examination o f group
means collapsed across presentation duration revealed that participants demonstrated a
more conservative response style in the categorization o f threatening target stimuli
compared to positive stimuli than when comparing threatening to neutral stimuli (M =
•17, SD = .31; M = .02, SD = .30, respectively). These results indicate that participants
were slightly more conservative in their response style, making fewer false alarms to
positive stimuli than to neutral stimuli. In this analysis, the response style o f individuals
to neutral information is not biased in either direction, since c = .02 and is not
significantly different from c = 0, t (72) = .49, g = n.s.. A main effect o f Anxiety Level
was also observed, F (1, 71) = 9.79, j> = .003, indicating that anxious participants
demonstrated a significantly more liberal overall response bias compared to nonanxious
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participants (M = -.07, SE = .05; M = .19. SE = .05, respectively). However, these results
need to be qualified due to two significant interaction effects that were also noted. An
interaction was found between Presentation Duration and Target/Distractor comparison, F
(1, 71) = 37.45, p < .001. Paired comparisons indicated a significant difference between
the supralim inal and sublim inal presentation durations o f threatening/positive stimuli, t
(72) = 2.77, p = .007. The average response bias parameter (c) for supraliminal
threatening/positive stimuli was .25 (.29) and for the subliminal condition was .09 (.48),
indicating a more conservative response style with fewer false alarms in the supraliminal
condition. The overall response bias estimate for the subliminal condition did not
significantly differ from c = 0 and accordingly, does not reflect a biased response style, t
(72) = 1.52, p = n.s.. A m argin al triple-order interaction among Presentation Duration,
Target/Distractor comparison, and Anxiety Level was also found and qualifies the main
effect and lower-order interaction previously discussed, F (1,71) = 3.78, p = .05. A
univariate strategy was employed to examine the significant overall interaction and
results are contained in Table 9. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (threat/neutral,
threat/positive comparisons) ANOVA was performed for data in the subliminal
presentation condition. Results indicated that high and low anxious individuals differed
in their response pattern to threatening words when considering neutral distractors, F (1,
72) = 7.11, p = .009, and positive distractors, F (1, 72) = 5.65, p = .02. A 2 (low vs. high
anxious) X 2 (threat/neutral, threat/positive comparisons) ANOVA was performed for
data from the supraliminal condition. In the supraliminal condition, high and low anxious
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individuals differed only in their response pattern to threat/positive words, F (1, 72) =
7.65, g = .007. Overall, anxious individuals evidenced a more liberal response strategy,
making a higher proportion o f false alarms for all subliminally presented information.
When information was presented supraliminally, anxious individuals maintained a
response style that tended to be more liberal compared to nonanxious individuals.
Although differences were not quite as robust in the supraliminal condition, the pattern o f
results remained comparable.
Table 9
Average Response Bias (c) bv Presentation Duration. Anxiety Level, and
Target/Distractor Comparison

Presentation Duration

Supraliminal

Subliminal

Low Anxious

High Anxious

Low Anxious

High Anxious

Target/
Distractor

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

Threat/
Neutral

.19

.50

-.10*

.43

.02

.42

- .05

Threat/
Positive

.22

.49

..04** .44

.34

.26

Note. * 2 = 009, **p = .02, ***2 = .007
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SD

.32

.16*** .29

Decision Time. Decision time refers to the time, measured in milliseconds, that
it took participants to categorize stimuli in the affective categorization task. Consistent
with the approach taken in pilot work, responses that were less than 100ms and greater
than or equal to 3 standard deviations above the average response time were excluded.
Using this strategy, fewer than 1% o f the total number o f responses were excluded. A 2
(low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive
word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant main
effect o f Presentation Duration, F (1, 71) = 5.38, p = .02, and Word Type, F (2,142) —
8.48, p < .001, qualified by a Presentation Duration by Word Type interaction, F (2,142)
= 9.09, p < .001. A significant overall triple-order interaction also emerged F (2, 142) =
3.78, p = .03, however follow-up univariate tests were not significantly different. An
inspection o f condition means indicates that decision times were significantly longer in
the subliminal condition compared to the supraliminal condition (M = 1095, SE = 41.91;
M = 1020, SE = 32.72, respectively). Paired comparisons, including Bonferroni’s
corrections, were used to examine the Word Type main effect and indicated that positive
words produced a significantly shorter decision time compared to neutral words and
nonwords, which did not differ significantly from each other (M = 1023, SD = 300; M =
1095, SD = 332; M = 1089, SD = 411, respectively). Similar comparisons were also used
to examine the second-order interaction and revealed that decision times were
significantly longer for positive words in the subliminal condition compared to the
supraliminal condition (M = 1098, SD = 375; M = 948, SD = 294, respectively).
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Decision times for threatening and neutral words did not significantly differ as a function
o f presentation duration. Furthermore, there were no significant effects o f anxiety level
on decision time.
An exploratory sub-analysis o f decision time was conducted to examine congruent
and incongruent decisions to threatening stimuli. A congruent decision was considered a
“danger” response to a threatening stimulus and an incongruent decision was considered a
“safe” response to a threatening stimulus. This analysis was undertaken in order to
determine whether there was an effect o f anxiety for threatening vs. nonthreatening
categorizations o f threatening stimuli. Threatening stimuli were selected to be examined
first, as this word category should demonstrate the strongest effects. As the most robust
differences are expected to emerge in the threatening category, if no effects o f anxiety
were apparent for congruent or incongruent decisions to threatening stimuli, then it would
not appear necessary to pursue further analyses using additional word categories. As
such, a 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (congruent vs.
incongruent decision) Repeated Measures ANOVA was performed. A significant main
effect o f Decision Type emerged, F (1, 56) = 10.51, p = .002, indicating that all
participants were relatively faster in making congruent decisions compared to incongruent
decisions (M = 1040, SE = 33.74; M = 1192, SE = 64.56). In addition, an interaction was
noted between Presentation Duration and Decision Type, F (1, 56) = 4.12, j> = .047.
Paired comparisons, including appropriate corrections, indicated that individuals
demonstrated relative speeding for congruent compared to incongruent decisions to
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threatening stimuli in the supraliminal condition (M ~ 1030, SE = 35; M = 1282, SE =
102). This sub-analysis demonstrated that individuals were faster for congruent
decisions, particularly under conditions o f longer presentation durations. Results o f this
analysis do not indicate relative speeding in anxious individuals for any decisions
regarding threatening information.
Task B (Pathfinder Task)
The Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990) methodology is a computer program that
generates associative networks based on proximity data or ratings o f similarity. From
data files containing a matrix o f similarity ratings for all word pairs, a component o f the
Pathfinder program, PCKNOT (Knowledge Network Organizing Tool for IBM PCs),
locates the essential links in the network and generates a Pathfinder network (PFnet),
among other essential functions. The data file resulting from these operations is called a
“layout file”. A separate layout file for each participant is produced and indicates the
associative link patterns in the network from which a graphic representation can be
generated, as well as the total number o f links in the associative network. The Pathfinder
algorithm uses the parameters o f r = infinity and q = n-1 to generate associative networks.
The use o f r = infinity assumes that the rating data is ordinal in nature, a conservative
estimate o f the properties o f the ratings. In the equation q = n-1, n represents the number
of concepts used to generate the ratings. Restricting q to n-1 allows Pathfinder to
generate the least dense networks. One o f the advantages o f considering Pathfinder
networks is that they represent the unwieldy information represented by a large number o f
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similarity ratings in a more condensed and easily interpretable format. Although a wealth
o f information is provided by the Pathfinder program through the use o f PCKNOT, much
o f it is qualitative in nature. Therefore, since I wish to rely on more objective measures
o f association (i.e., number o f associative links), additional analyses are performed on the
data represented in the layout files. Information from the layout file regarding concept
associations and node positioning is computed by a separate computer program that
generates several other dependent variables. These include the number o f links within
specific word categories, between all combinations o f word categories considered two at
a time, and on individual words.
The dependent variable considered in this analysis is the number o f associative
links in the network. The number o f links will be considered separately for each type of
comparison (i.e., total links, within cluster links, and between cluster links). Recall that
the number o f links on a word provides a quantitative measure o f the complexity o f a
concept or of the relatedness o f specific categories of information considered together. In
this way, a quantitative index o f knowledge representation between high and low anxious
individuals can be empirically examined.
The first comparison examines the overall number o f links within the associative
network for the entire domain o f words under study. A univariate ANOVA was
performed on data representing the total number o f links in participants’ networks using
anxiety level as the only between-subjects variable. No significant group differences in
the total number o f associative links were found, F ( l , 71)= 1.66, p = n.s.
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To explore the number o f links within the three word categories, a 2 (low vs. high
anxious) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the
GLM procedure was conducted. There was a significant main effect o f Word Type, F (2,
142) = 100.81, p < .001, although the expected interaction between Word Type and
Anxiety Level was not found. Paired t-tests revealed that the total sample evidenced
significantly more links within the positive word category compared to either threatening,
t (72) 12.27, p < .001, or neutral words, t (72) = 11.42, p < .001, which did not
significantly differ from each other (M =11.11, SD = 3.06; M = 6.26, SD = 2.48; M =
5.82, SD = 2.49, respectively).
The number o f links between word categories was also examined to investigate
whether high and low anxious individuals evidenced more complex networks for a subset
of the domain o f information employed in this experiment. A 2 (low vs. high anxiety) X
3

(threat-positive, threat-neutral, neutral-positive between word type comparison)

Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was conducted. A main effect o f
Between Category comparison was found, F (2, 142) = 51.73, p < .001, although, again,
no effect o f anxiety on the dependent variable was observed. Paired comparisons
revealed that participants had a greater number o f links between the threatening and
positive word categories compared to the number o f links between either threatening
words and neutral words, t (72) = -8.23, p < .001, or positive words and neutral words, t
(72) = -7.90, p < .001

(M = 6.51, SD = 5.36; M =

164. SD = 1.75; M = 1-70, SD = 3.98,

respectively).
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Discussion
The overall aims o f the present research project were fulfilled. Specifically, the
literature base exam ining cognition and emotion was broadened and several interesting
results merit further discussion. Refinements to the affective categorization task
methodology based on the pilot data were beneficial and help to clarify the current picture
regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the production o f threat-related
processing biases. In general, the results of the full study replicate and extend the
findings obtained in pilot work. I will begin the present discussion by interpreting the
significance o f relevant results and evaluating how the findings obtained matched a priori
assumptions, as well as relevant theories of information processing.
Before I can undertake a discussion o f the data relevant to the experimental
hypotheses, I must be certain that the stimuli I am referring to as subliminal are in fact
subliminal. To examine the ability o f participants in this study to consciously perceive
briefly presented visual stimuli, objective awareness o f subliminally presented stimuli
must be measured. The findings were consistent with participants demonstrating an
overall lack o f awareness o f subliminal stimuli, as evidenced by lexical decision accuracy
that was no greater than chance levels o f discrimination and measures o f sensitivity that
were nil. These measures indicate that participants had virtually no ability to discriminate
between subliminally presented words and nonwords.
Recall that in pilot work, a greater than expected number o f participants
demonstrated above chance levels o f discrimination. Consequently, methodological
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changes in the presentation and selection o f stimuli were proposed in the full study to
address this issue. In the affective categorization task, stimuli were presented either
sublim inally or supraliminally, but not in both conditions. Additionally, a novel subset o f

stimuli were selected for inclusion in the lexical decision trials. These methodological
changes appeared to be generally successful in reducing objective awareness o f
subliminal stimuli. Although average classification rates in the lexical decision task were
reduced significantly after making this change (from 67% to 55%), the overall lexical
decision classification rate remained statistically greater than chance. This was the case
even though stimuli were presented for only 14 ms followed by a backward pattern mask
designed to preclude stimulus processing. This finding is particularly meaningful as it
points to the importance o f evaluating the ability o f participants to perceive seemingly
“subliminal” stimuli. Therefore, when using standard presentation times for subliminal
stimuli, it is imperative that the ability o f participants to detect stimuli be accurately
measured and not simply assumed. One methodological alternative that could be
employed in future research is to tailor presentation times to individualized thresholds,
whereby, each participant demonstrates a lack o f objective awareness o f subliminal
material. Doing so could result in less wasted effort in running participants through the
entire experimental protocol and then having to discard their data when they do not meet
lexical awareness criteria.
As participants appeared unable to consciously perceive subliminally presented
information, an evaluation o f the first experimental hypothesis may proceed. I predicted

80

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that information in the affective categorization task would be processed subliminally. As
in the pilot study, subliminal processing was illustrated by the observation that
participants were able to classify lexical subliminal stimuli with a greater than 60%
accuracy. Sensitivity measures were also computed on the affective categorization task
data and indicated that participants evidenced some ability to discriminate subliminal
stimuli. This same subset o f participants was no better than chance at classifying
subliminally presented words and nonwords, demonstrating an apparent lack of
awareness o f the semantic content o f subliminal information. Despite participants’
inability to classify subliminally presented words and nonwords at any better than chance
levels, individuals were able to decipher at least some o f the basic features o f stimuli in
the affective categorization task. That is, in the affective categorization task participants
were able to accurately classify subliminal stimuli at greater than chance levels. How
should this finding be interpreted?
Other researchers (Marcel, 1983) have demonstrated that when visual stimuli are
degraded to the point at which they are no longer consciously perceived, the ability to
make complex semantic judgments persist. In the area o f emotional information
processing, it has been observed that individuals consistently make preference judgments
for stimuli without an apparent ability to report the basis upon which those judgments are
made (Zajonc, 1980). Additionally, early work in the area o f emotion and word
recognition, although methodologically questionable, focused attention on the apparently
persistent influence o f emotion on perception. That work examining a phenomenon
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referred to as perceptual defense, in which “taboo” words were shown to have higher
recognition thresholds than neutral or positively valenced information (see Niedenthai,
1992, for a review), generated theories aimed at describing how “the emotionality o f the
input may affect the perception o f the input” (Erdelyi, 1974, p. 14). Later work has
demonstrated disruptive effects o f negative emotional information on performance (see
Williams, et al., 1997, for a cogent review). As such, it may be that affective information
may exert a primacy effect on some cognitive processes. In fact, Dixon (1981) asserts
that '‘the emotional connotations of an external stimulus may be reacted to before or
without achieving conscious representation, and this emotional ‘classification, then
determines subsequent events” (p. 121). Therefore, consistent with prior research in the
area o f subliminal processing, I was able to demonstrate the influence o f emotion on preconscious processing o f information. However, this effect is simply a necessary
prerequisite to the more specific goal o f investigating the effects o f a discrete mood state,
anxiety, on information processing. I will reserve further commentary on the more
general effects o f emotional meaning on subliminal processing until I describe the overall
findings in greater detail.
The second and third experimental hypotheses address the accurate categorization
o f classes o f stimuli and therefore are closely related. It was predicted that anxious
individuals would evidence an enhanced ability to correctly classify subliminally
presented threatening stimuli, whereas, nonanxious individuals would demonstrate an
enhanced ability to correctly categorize subliminally presented neutral and positive
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information. Nonwords were not expected to discriminate between individuals who
differed in anxiety. In general, this is what was found. When considering hit and false
alarm rates, anxious individuals demonstrate a higher hit rate for subliminal threatening
information. However, anxious individuals also evidence a significantly higher false
alarm rate to neutral and positive words. A nonsignificant trend was also observed in that
anxious individuals categorize nonwords as dangerous more often than nonanxious
participants. Nonanxious individuals make fewer false alarms to neutral and positive
stimuli and therefore, are seemingly better at classifying these types o f information. Such
a finding is consistent with other work demonstrating a positivity bias in normals
(Constans, et al., 1999; MacLeod, et al., 1986; Taylor & Hope, 1989). That work has
demonstrated that nonpathologically anxious individuals appear to have a tendency to
divert attentional resources to information that is nonthreatening. Because o f an
enhanced tendency to focus on nonthreatening information, nonanxious individuals may
be better able to accurately classify information that is positive in valence. In some ways,
these data could be viewed from an expertise model. Anxious and nonanxious
individuals, through biological mechanisms or prior learning history, may be better able
to classify information that they are more familiar with or that is more relevant to them.
It was demonstrated that at a pre-conscious level, individuals are able to process
information to such an extent that differences in affective categorizations can be reliably
tied to varying levels o f trait anxiety.
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However, rather than speculate on the implications o f the relationship between
raw hit and false alarm rates observed in the affective categorization task data, I have
chosen to employ the methodology o f signal detection theory to evaluate the independent
contributions o f both accurate and inaccurate classifications o f target stimuli. Signal
detection theory is an approach which takes into account standardized hit and false alarm
rates so that an index o f one’s ability to discriminate among classes o f stimuli and a
measure o f an individual’s tendency to respond in a particular manner is obtained. By
examining the data in this way, I am able to ascertain whether individuals are able to
more accurately categorize certain classes o f stimuli due to an enhanced ability to detect
and process a stimulus’ meaning or whether such a difference arises from a tendency to
consistently select one response in favor o f another, independent o f stimulus content.
Analyses using signal detection theory further clarify the hit and false alarm rate
data. Recall that anxious participants evidence a greater proportion o f danger responses
to subliminally presented threatening stimuli which translates into enhanced hit rates for
threatening information. However, anxious participants also were observed to classify
subliminally presented neutral and positive information as dangerous more often, leading
to greater false alarm rates. In contrast, nonanxious participants evidence a lower hit rate
for threatening information and enhanced hit rates for subliminally presented neutral and
positive information. The increased ability o f anxious individuals to classify threatening
stimuli and nonanxious individuals to classify neutral or positive stimuli does not appear
to be due to an enhanced ability to discern the lexical or affective qualities o f subliminally
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presented content-specific information. In fact, it appears that highly trait anxious
individuals are predisposed to respond to subliminally presented lexical information,
regardless o f affective valence, with a threatening interpretation. In other words, anxious
individuals make significantly more false alarms to subliminally presented information
that is neutral or positive in valence than nonanxious individuals. Such a response pattern
translates into a response bias for anxious individuals when considering subliminal
lexical information. A similar, although less consistent response pattern is apparent for
supraliminal information. Interestingly, there was no significant difference between
anxious and nonanxious individuals for the threatening/nonword comparison, although
results tended in that direction. Therefore, it seems that the observed response bias in
anxious individuals is more robust for lexical stimuli compared to nonlexical stimuli.
However, it seems that the increased ability o f anxious and nonanxious
individuals to categorize threatening and nonthreatening material is accounted for by a
trade-off in the rate o f false alarms to such stimuli. In other words, anxious individuals
are less accurate in categorizing briefly presented nonthreatening lexical stimuli because
they are more likely to categorize such information as “dangerous”. Nonanxious
individuals are less likely to categorize all subliminally presented lexical information,
including threatening stimuli, as dangerous, so they are less accurate when attempting to
categorize threat information. According to Ohman’s (1993) model o f fear and anxiety, a
perceptual system, that has evolved to effectively locate threat in one’s environment, is
more adaptive and successful when there is a liberal perceptual threshold in which false
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alarms are m axim ized. Thereby, processing mechanisms that identify threatening stimuli
on the basis o f relatively simple features and are biased in the interpretation o f threat are
essential. In fact, the data point to such mechanisms at work in the categorization o f
su b lim inally presented verbal stimuli in anxious individuals. Such effects appear to

operate more strongly at pre-attentive levels, as evidenced by the lack o f consistent
differences demonstrated under conditions o f conscious processing. This is consistent
with the theoretical models proposed by Williams and colleagues (1988; 1997) and
Ohman (1993). Pre-attentive mechanisms appear to function largely to classify stimuli as
threatening or not (Mathews, 1988). Anxious individuals appear to have a predisposition
to classify briefly presented information as threatening. However, under conditions in
which processing is allowed to proceed consciously, there is a reduced tendency to
respond with a threatening interpretation.
Although prior data (see Williams, et al., 1997) and theoretical speculation
suggest that anxious individuals may possess an enhanced ability to select threatening
information from the environment, this was not observed in the current study. Increased
discrimination o f threatening content may, in fact, be apparent in anxious individuals,
despite the lack o f ability to demonstrate it using the current methodology. According to
Mathews (1988), the consistent demonstration o f a processing priority for threatening
information in anxious individuals is observed in situations in which there is a
competition for cognitive resources. The design o f the present study employed a single
stimulus presentation and was not an attempt to examine a resource competition
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hypothesis. As such, the categorization o f single stimuli may not be a methodological
paradigm which is sensitive to differences in stimulus discriminability. A modification to
the current methodology that would address this particular hypothesis could include a
dual stimulus display. It could also be argued that enhanced sensitivity for threat in
anxious individuals may be a function o f more basic perceptual processes, like perception
and initial encoding o f stimuli. Response bias processes may be more influential at later
stages o f information processing when an actual response is selected. The categorization
o f words based on semantic meaning is believed to occur at later stages o f processing,
drawing on input from information gathered during initial registration and encoding.
Therefore, the affective categorization task may simply be a more accurate way o f
exam ining processing biases influencing response selection at later stages o f information

processing.
Notwithstanding, the presence o f either enhanced discriminability for threatening
information in the environment or a biased tendency to perceive and interpret information
as threatening or both could account for the empirical findings o f threat-related
information processing biases in anxiety. Further investigations o f these mechanisms and
the conditions under which they are apparent could offer insight into the etiology and
maintenance o f the disordered cognitions which characterize anxious individuals.
To further elucidate the mechanisms involved in processing differences between
anxious and nonanxious individuals, decision times for affective categorizations were
examined. I expected, based on pilot work, that anxious individuals would evidence
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slowing for affective categorization decisions. However, in the complete study no group
differences on this dependent variable emerged. A potential explanation for the
incongruence in findings regarding decision time between the pilot study and the actual
study could be that the anxious group in the pilot study was made up o f only two
individuals, one o f whom was significantly older than the remainder o f the sample.
Reaction time experiments have demonstrated that the age o f participants correlates
positively with reaction time (J. Constans, personal communication, June, 1999).
Therefore, age effects cannot be ruled out as a potential confound responsible for the
lengthened decision times observed in the pilot data. However, this alternative
explanation must be considered purely speculative given the small number o f individuals
in the high anxious group. Hence, the age confound in the pilot study cannot be ruled out
as a plausible interpretation o f the data, however, it also cannot be accepted
unequivocably.
The alternative prediction related to decision time proposes that decision times
should be faster to material that matches the mood o f the perceiver. The theoretical basis
for response speeding is based on a network model which asserts that as a result o f
priming and the spreading o f activation, individuals who are in a specific mood state
should attend to and recall information compatible with their current mood state. I found
no evidence for speeding o f affective decisions as a function o f mood state, consistent
with other work examining decision times for lexical or affective decisions (Hill &
Kemp-Wheeler, 1989; MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & Milroy,
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1994). It could be argued that the lack o f a significant effect could be due to a failure to
manipulate current mood. This appears to be an unlikely explanation for the null results
observed, since estimates o f current mood were obtained in this study. Highly trait
anxious participants reported significantly greater current negative mood states as
measured by the STAI. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that generally anxious
participants were also more anxious at the time o f testing than nonanxious participants.
As such, the mood congruity hypothesis does not appear to be borne out by the present
data. A plausible reason for the lack o f findings for decision time speeding could be
related to Mathews and MacLeod’s (1994) assertion that there may, in fact, be no overall
increase in speed or efficiency in the processing o f threatening information by anxious
individuals. Alternatively, they propose that threatening information is only preferentially
encoded when other information is presented in the same context. Another potential
explanation for the present failure to find mood congruent speeding in anxious
individuals may be found in an analysis of network data.
No differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals were demonstrated
when exam ining network complexity for the domain o f information considered in this
study. Mood-congruent memory effects are founded on the supposition that there are
differences in network representations for information which is congruent with the mood
o f the perceiver. In this study, using generally anxious and nonanxious college students,
there were no demonstrable differences in the stimuli selected to represent network
knowledge organization for threatening and nonthreatening types o f information. If there
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truly are no differences in the long-term storage o f information between these two types
o f individuals, then I would not expect, at least under conditions that allow strategic
elaboration, differences in the speed with which individuals respond to material that is the
focus o f their concern. Therefore, the lack o f differences found with regard to network
complexity is consistent with the dearth o f findings with regard to decision time.
However, it would be premature, based on one attempt to demonstrate network
knowledge differences, to conclude that there are no differences between anxious and
nonanxious individuals in knowledge organization for threatening and nonthreatening
information. It is possible that I failed to demonstrate differences in network organization
due to an unrepresentative sample o f the domain o f stimuli used in the present study. It is
possible, although unlikely, that there is some inherent factor o f the subset o f stimuli
selected for inclusion in the network generation task that precluded finding significant
differences between the individuals in this study. That seems to be an implausible
explanation for the current results due to the careful attention that was paid to the
selection o f stimuli for the overall experiment and the random manner in which a subset
o f stimuli was drawn for inclusion in the network generation task.
One potential modification to the current methodology that might aid in the
clarification o f network differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals,
assuming they do in fact exist, would be the inclusion o f labels related to evaluative
dimensions tapping “danger” (e.g., risky, dangerous, threatening) and “safe” (e.g., safe,
harmless, innocuous) dimensions. Since no evaluative component was included in the
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present study, I was only able to evaluate the semantic structure o f specific domains o f
information and were unable to examine the relationship between specific classes o f
information and threatening and nonthreatening evaluations. It is possible that the
organization o f information between anxious and nonanxious individuals does not differ
for specific classes o f information, but would differ for associative representations
between negative and positive evaluative concepts and affectively congruent information.
Another potential explanation for the lack o f significant findings for network
differences could be that the level at which a bias is observed in the processing o f
threatening information does not arise from structures which represent the long-term
storage o f information. Processing biases associated with anxious mood states have been
interpreted to result from mechanisms operating at much earlier stages o f information
processing, such as perceptual and attentional processes. In fact, the data suggest that
anxiety-related processing biases in affective categorizations operate more strongly at
earlier pre-conscious levels o f awareness. Theoretically, some alternatives to network
theory, specifically, the models offered by Williams and colleagues (1997) and Ohman
(1993), posit the origin o f threat-related biases in anxiety as resulting from mechanisms
that are influenced by, but not necessarily directly related to long-term knowledge
organization. Data from the current research is consistent with those models and point to
a clear tendency for anxious individuals to label all information that is barely perceptible
as threatening. It does not support an interpretation that describes anxious individuals as
being any better than nonanxious individuals in detecting threat in their environment due
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to differences in internal semantic representations o f threatening information in memory.
The existence o f such a bias in anxious individuals has multiple significant implications.
Under conditions in which information is encountered briefly and there is no opportunity
for more extensive evaluation to clarify what was perceived, a tendency for anxious
individuals to perceive a threatening meaning in innocuous stimuli could lead to
enhanced encoding o f threat to the exclusion o f alternative interpretations. In other
words, under such conditions, anxious individuals would encode a threatening meaning to
stimuli and therefore have a biased source o f information with which to guide future
behavior. Biased encoding of information could even lead to the development or
maintenance o f cognitive distortions (e.g., mislabeling, fortune-teller error) and
dysfunctional schemata (e.g., “The world is a dangerous place.”) that are purported to be
involved in the maintenance o f pathological anxiety (Beck, 1976). If cognitive resources
are preferentially allocated to the processing o f information labeled as threatening,
regardless o f the content o f information, processing resources are squandered needlessly.
As such, fewer resources are available for other tasks and performance decrements can
result. Additionally, a tendency in anxious individuals to cognitively label harmless
information as threatening, could lead to increased autonomic arousal and serve to
maintain a heightened physical response that is both distressing to the individual and
maladaptive in the long term. Therefore, a response style biased in the direction o f threat
may serve to color the basic perception of information and, in combination with other
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processing biases, result in a distorted view o f stimuli in the environment and subsequent
impairments in the ability to discriminate the true content o f affective information.
Future researchers may wish to include individuals with clinical levels o f anxiety
since it may be the case that there are basic differences in the associative representation o f
knowledge for anxious and nonanxious individuals, but that such differences do not exist
at nonpathological levels o f anxiety. Perhaps, knowledge representation differences may
emerge only at the most extreme levels o f anxiety for information that is more relevant to
the feared object. General levels o f anxiety and verbal stimuli that are relatively familiar
in one’s environment may be too nonspecific and not emotionally relevant enough to
evoke changes in the structural knowledge representations o f long-term memory. The
evaluation o f highly anxiety-provoking stimuli in a clinical population may offer
additional insight into the mechanisms underlying threat-related biases.
In summary, the overall aims o f the proposed study were accomplished. I was
able to demonstrate that the affective quality o f a stimulus influences some aspects o f
affective categorization decisions. The influence o f emotion on affective decisions was
most strongly apparent under conditions o f subliminal processing. A similar, although
less robust pattern o f findings, was observed under conditions o f elaborative processing
and indicate the possibility that different mechanisms are involved in the processing o f
information under automatic and strategic levels o f cognition. I was also able to
demonstrate an apparent response bias evident in generally anxious individuals, whereby,
they have a tendency to categorize all information, although particularly subliminal
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information, as threatening. No differences were observed between anxious and
nonanxious individuals under conditions o f either subliminal or supraliminal processing
in sensitivity, or the ability to detect the accurate meaning o f stimuli. Affective
categorization differences were not reliably related to decision speed or network
complexity. Results obtained in the present study further indicate the necessity o f
expanding the scope o f information processing biases in anxiety beyond a simplistic
network account.
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Appendix A
Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SAD)
(Watson & Friend, 1969)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F

11.
12.
13.
14.

T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F

26.
27.
28.

T
T
T

F
F
F

I feel relaxed even in unfamiliar social situations.
I try to avoid situations which force me to be very sociable.
It is easy for me to relax when I am with strangers.
1 have no particular desire to avoid people.
I often find social occasions upsetting.
I usually feel calm and comfortable at social occasions.
I am usually at ease when talking to someone o f the opposite sex.
I try to avoid talking to people unless I know them well.
If the chance comes to meet new people, I usually take it.
I often feel nervous or tense in casual get-togethers in which both
sexes are present.
I am usually nervous with people unless I know them well.
I usually feel relaxed when I am with a group o f people.
I often want to get away from people.
I usually feel uncomfortable when I am in a group o f people I
don’t know.
I usually feel relaxed when I meet someone for the first time.
Being introduced to people makes me tense and nervous.
Even though a room is fall o f strangers, I may enter it anyway.
I would avoid walking up and joining a large group o f people.
When my superiors want to talk to me, I talk willingly.
I often feel on edge when I am with a group o f people.
I tend to withdraw from people.
I don’t mind talking to people at parties or social gatherings.
I am seldom at ease in a large group o f people.
I often think up excuses in order to avoid social engagements.
I sometimes take the responsibility for introducing people to each
other.
I try to avoid formal social occasions.
1 usually go to whatever social engagement I have.
I find it easy to relax with other people.
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Appendix B
Pilot Words and Category Assignment
THREAT
Social
criticism
disgrace
embarrassment
failure
fool
gossip
hatred
humiliation
idiot
inadequacy
incompetence
inferiority
insult
loneliness
loser
misfit
outcast
rejection
scom
stupidity
POSITIVE
Social
acceptance
admiration
adoration
applause
approval
assurance
attraction
charisma
charm
compliment
confidence
friendship
glory

NEUTRAL
Social
approach
chat
conversation
encounter
gathering
group
host
interaction
meeting
mingling
negotiation
others
participation
party
people
presentation
reception
society
speech
talking

Nonsocial
accident
agony
ambulance
assault
beating
coffin
corpse
crutches
disability
disease
emergency
fatality
illness
infection
injury
mutilation
paralysis
sickness
stabbing
violence

Nonsocial
bliss
contentment
delight
enjoyment
euphoria
excellence
excitement
faith
goodness
greatness
happiness
hope
joy

popularity
praise
respect
success
talent
honor
love

Nonsocial
armoire
bathtub
bedroom
blanket
blender
bookend
cabinet
canister
cookbook
dishwasher
dresser
faucet
fireplace
lawnmower
linoleum
magazine
screwdriver
sponge
staircase
wallpaper

pleasure
prize
satisfaction
serenity
virtue
miracle
peace
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Appendix C
Social Neutral Category Generation Instructions
I am entreating your help in generating a subset o f words for use in my dissertation. I
would like to develop a list of social words that are neutral in emotional valence. For
example, clearly socially threatening (negative) words would be embarrassment,
humiliation, etc. Positive (non-threatening) social words would be exemplified by words
like poised, attractive, etc. I would like to compose a list o f social words that may be
either threatening or non-threatening, but are not clearly one or the other. For example,
words that I have thought o f so far are date, party, conversation, group, etc. In the space
below, please write down as many words as you can think o f that may fit this general
category and return to my mailbox ASAP.
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Appendix D
Social/Non-Social W ord Categorization Task
The following list contains a number o f different types o f words. Please place the words
into 1 o f 2 categories: SO CIAL or NON-SOCIAL. A social word is a word that
specifically relates to social interactions between people and or evaluation by others (e.g.,
dance, hate). Words that are not specifically related to social interactions would be
considered non-social. Such words could represent simple objects, events or feelings
related to physical health and well-being, and/or positive feelings or personality traits. If
you are unsure about how to categorize a word, please make the best choice. Choose only
one category and do not leave any blank.
SO CIAL = 1
NON-SOCIAL = 2
paper
_
shelf
_
euphoria
_
applause
scom
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television

talking
__
conversation __
failure
__
fatality
__
chimney
__
foolishness
_
disgrace
_
mingling
_
_
look
canister
_
agony
_
happiness
_
furniture
__
comfort
_
blanket
_
blood
_
serenity
_
relaxation
_
chat
_
ineptness
_
date
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment

greatness
_
gutter
_
stupidity
_
party
_
approval
_
hearse
_
calendar
_
speech
_
qualification _
talent
optimism
telephone
embarrassment
interaction
encounter
bookend
acceptance
attraction
amusement
tumor
indecision
introduction
boldness
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
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Appendix E
Fam iliarity Rating Task
Please rate how familiar you are with the following words using the scale below. On this
scale, smaller numbers represent a lack o f familiarity (seldom using, thinking of, seeing,
or hearing a word) while larger numbers represent a high degree o f familiarity (frequently
using, seeing, thinking of, or hearing a word). Place the appropriate number (1-7) in the
blank.
-I-

'

1
2
Not at all familiar

4
5
Moderately familiar

paper
_
shelf
_
euphoria
_
applause
_
scom
_
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation _
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television
luxury
carpet

__
talking
conversation __
failure
__
fatality
__
chimney
__
foolishness
_
disgrace
_
mingling
_
look
_
canister
_
agony
_
happiness
_
furniture
_
comfort
_
blanket
_
blood
_
serenity
_
relaxation
_
chat
_
ineptness
_
date
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment
host
others

■

1

1

6
7
Extremely familiar
greatness
_
gutter
_
stupidity
_
party
_
approval
_
hearse
_
calendar
_
speech
_
qualification _
talent
optimism
telephone
embarrassment
interaction
encounter
bookend
acceptance
attraction
amusement
tumor
indecision
introduction
boldness
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
assurance
group
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Appendix F
Emotionality Rating Task
Please rate the following words for emotionality. Emotionality is defined as the ability o f
the word to produce a strong subjective response or feeling that can be either positive or
negative. Use the following numeric scale when making word ratings. Place the
appropriate whole number (1-7) in the blank next to each word. If you are unsure o f the
meaning o f a word, leave it blank.
-I-

1
2
Very strong
negative emotion
paper
shelf
euphoria
_
applause
_
scom
__
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television

4
5
Neither positive
or negative
talking
conversation
failure
fatality
chimney
foolishness
disgrace
mingling
look
canister
agony
_
happiness
_
furniture
_
comfort
_
blanket
_
blood
_
serenity
_
relaxation
_
chat
_
ineptness
_
date
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment

'I
-I---------6
7
Very strong
positive emotion

greatness
_
gutter
_
stupidity
_
party
_
approval
_
hearse
_
calendar
_
speech
_
qualification _
talent
_
optimism
_
telephone
embarrassment^
interaction
encounter
bookend
acceptance
attraction
amusement
tumor
indecision
introduction
boldness
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
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Appendix G
General Experimental Instructions
“In the first set o f trials you will be asked to make “safe” and “danger” judgments to
neutral and emotional words. Some o f these words will be presented very rapidly. A safe
word is a word that is non-threatening and a danger word is a word that is threatening. If
you are unsure, then make a guess. If you have no questions, please read and follow the
instructions on the computer screen.”
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Appendix H
Computer Task Instructions
Overall Instructions
“This experiment involves making judgments about words that are presented at various
speeds. Some o f the words that you will see in this experiment will be presented very
rapidly. Please pay attention to all o f the words and try to make the best judgment you
can. If you are uncertain about what you saw, then guess.
At the beginning o f each trial, a + sign will be presented in the center o f the computer
screen. After the offset o f this + sign, a word will appear. Your job is to press the ‘z’
(‘/ ’) key if the word means ‘danger’ and to press the 7 ’ (‘z ’) key if the word means ‘safe’.
In the second part o f the experiment, the + sign will either be replaced by a meaningful
word or a non-word. Your job in this part is to press the ‘z ’ ( ‘/ ’) key if a non-word was
presented and to press the 7 ’ ( ‘z’) key if a meaningful word was presented.
There will always be several practice trials before each set o f experimental trials. Press
the space-bar to view the instructions for the first set o f trials.”
Instructions for affective categorization task
“These are the instructions for the first set o f trials. In all o f these trials you will first see
a + sign. Immediately following the + sign, a word will appear, perhaps very briefly.
Your job is to press the ‘z’ (‘/’) key if the word presented means ‘danger’ and to press the
7 ’ (‘z’) key if the word means ‘safe’. This task is completely subjective and you should
make the judgment that seems best as quickly as possible.
First, there will be a series of practice trials in which you will receive feedback about your
performance. Once the experimental trials begin, you will no longer receive any feedback
about your performance.
Please place your left index finger on the ‘z’ key and place your right index finger on the
7 ’ key.
Press either key when you are ready to start the practice trials.”
Instructions for awareness check
“These are the instructions for the next set o f trials. Again, in all o f these trials, you will
first see a + sign. Immediately following the + sign, either a word or a non-word will be
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presented, followed by asterisks (******). In half (50%) o f the trials a word (candle) will
be presented and in half (50%) o f the trials a non-word (dnelca) will be presented.
In these trials, your job is to press the ‘z’ ( 7 ’) key if a non-word was presented
immediately before the asterisks (*****♦) and to press the 7 ’ ( ‘z’) key if a word was
presented immediately before the asterisks (******).
First, there will be a series o f practice trials in which you will receive feedback about your
performance. Once the experimental trials begin, you will no longer receive any feedback
about your performance.
Please place your left index finger on the ‘z’ key and place your right index finger on the
7 ’ key.
Press either key when you are ready to start the practice trials.”
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Appendix I
Participant Debriefing
You have just participated in a study that is part o f a more extensive research project
designed to investigate how different types o f people think about and evaluate positive
and negative social information. We are trying to determine if socially anxious people
think about and make judgments o f emotional words differently from people who are not
socially anxious. If you have any additional questions, please ask the experimenter now
or you can contact the graduate student responsible for the project at (504) 568-0811
x5389. Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix J
Affective Categorization Task Words
THREAT
accident; stupidity
ambulance; violence
assault
bandage
beating
blood
cancer
coffin
corpse
criticism
death
disability
disease
disgrace
embarrassment
emergency
failure
harm
hatred
hazard
hospital
humiliation
idiot
ignorance
illness
indecision
injury
insult
judgment
kill
loneliness
loser
mistake
mutilation
paralysis
rejection
sickness
stabbing

NEUTRAL
armoire; wallpaper
bathtub; window
bedroom
blanket
blender
bookend
burner
cabinet
calendar
canister
carpet
chimney
computer
cookbook
cup
dish
dishwasher
dresser
faucet
fireplace
furniture
garage
gutter
kitchen
lawnmower
magazine
mailbox
microwave
plate
plug
refrigerator
screwdriver
shelf
sponge
staircase
telephone
television
tongs

PO SITIVE
acceptance; talent
admiration; virtue
adoration
amusement
applause
approval
assurance
beauty
bliss
charisma
charm
compliment
contentment
delight
eloquence
enthusiasm
exuberance
faith
flattery
generosity
glory
goodness
gratitude
greatness
heaven
hero
joy
justice
laughter
love
miracle
optimism
peace
pleasure
praise
prize
satisfaction
serenity
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NONWOH
emudeawr
ajapsam
ntakopt
wimiutss
itubdoys
ecknackle
oxerbs
eawster
caktej
ilsperps
ttuonb
yegealses
aglosesh
unsassgles
asllvero
ayntospeh
suotrers
tabrete
tghignown
sohtrs

Appendix K.
Pathfinder Task Words
THREAT
cancer
accident
death
rejection
humiliation
loser

NEUTRAL
cabinet
faucet
carpet
microwave
armoire
dishwasher
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POSITIVE
pleasure
goodness
heaven
acceptance
praise
love
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